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THE CAUSATION FALLACY: 
BAKKE AND THE BASIC ARITHMETIC 
OF SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS 
Goodwin Liu* 
Last Term, the Supreme Court turned down two invitations to re­
solve the constitutionality of affirmative action in college and univer­
sity admissions. In May 2001, the Court for the second time declined 
to review a Fifth Circuit decision holding that the use of racial prefer­
ences to achieve diversity in the student body serves no compelling in­
terest.1 A few weeks later, the Court let stand a conflicting Ninth 
Circuit decision that upheld a .law school affirmative action policy on 
the ground that "educational diversity is a compelling governmental 
interest that meets the demands of strict scrutiny."2 The legal contro­
versy over admissions preferences intensified in August 2001 when the 
Eleventh Circuit invalidated the University of Georgia's undergradu­
ate affirmative action policy on the ground that it was not narrowly 
tailored.3 With the Sixth Circuit's recent decision upholding the 
University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action policy4 and yet 
another ruling expected soon,5 the debate will soon come to a full boil. 
Facing an array of divergent lower court opinions on the issue, the 
Supreme Court may well decide in the next few months that the time 
for a final resolution has come. 
Although the most recent legal challenges to racial preferences in 
university admissions vary in their details, they are unified by a com­
mon narrative - the same narrative that animated Allan Bakke's law-
* O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Washington, D.C. B.S. 1991, Stanford; B.A. 1993, Oxford; 
J.D. 1998, Yale. - Ed. I am grateful to Brianne Ford for research assistance and to Robert 
Gordon, Linda Lye, Nathaniel Persily, David Tatel, and Ann O'Leary for thoughtful com­
ments on earlier drafts and for encouragement and support during my writing process. 
1. See Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 
2550 (2001); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 
(1996); see also Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(suggesting in dicta that diversity may never constitute a compelling interest). 
2. Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1 188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
121 S. Ct. 2192 (2001); see id. at 1200 n.9 (acknowledging Hopwood as "contrary" authority, 
but rejecting it as "flaw[ed]"). 
3. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1254 (11th Cir. 2001). 
4. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002). 
5. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (upholding affirmative ac­
tion in University of Michigan undergraduate admissions policy), appeal docketed, Nos. 01-
1333, 01-1416, 01-1418 (6th Cir. Mar. 27, 2001). 
1045 
1046 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:1045 
suit against the Davis Medical School over twenty years ago.6 Bakke 
won admission to the medical school after convincing the Supreme 
Court that the school's practice of setting aside sixteen out of 100 seats 
in each incoming class for minority students was an unconstitutional 
racial quota. The record shows that Bakke was, in fact, a highly quali­
fied applicant. His undergraduate grades and standardized test scores 
were excellent, far better than the averages for minority students ad­
mitted through the set-aside. Yet the medical school rejected Bakke's 
application, even as it admitted minority applicants in numbers large 
enough to fill the sixteen-seat quota. This prompted Bakke to com­
plain that affirmative action cost him a letter of admission, and the 
success of his lawsuit confirms what so many people find unfair about 
affirmative action: By according substantial preferences to minority 
applicants, affirmative action causes the displacement of deserving 
white applicants like Allan Bakke and the plaintiffs now following in 
his footsteps.7 
This Article argues that the perceived unfairness is more exagger­
ated than real. The perception is a distortion of statistical truth, prem­
ised on an error in logic. There is strong evidence, as Bakke 's story 
suggests, that minority applicants stand a much better chance of gain­
ing admission to selective institutions with the existence of affirmative 
action. But that fact provides no logical basis to infer that white appli­
cants would stand a much better chance of admission in the absence of 
affirmative action. To draw such an inference, as opponents of af­
firmative action routinely do, is to indulge what I call "the causation 
fallacy" - the common yet mistaken notion that when white appli­
cants like Allan Bakke fail to gain admission ahead of minority appli­
cants with equal or lesser qualifications, the likely cause is affirmative 
action. 
The causation fallacy reflects white anxiety over the intensely 
competitive nature of selective admissions,8 and it undoubtedly ac-
6. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
7. Although I use the term "minority" to label applicants who benefit from affirmative 
action and the term "white" to label those who do not, I recognize that some minority appli­
cants do not benefit from affirmative action and that some affirmative action programs may 
benefit disadvantaged whites. Given this reality, it is probably more precise to use the ge­
neric terms "preferred" and "nonpreferred" applicants. But I stick to the terms "minority" 
and "white" in order to track the usage in common discourse on affirmative action. As 
Bakke's claim demonstrates, that discourse typically characterizes affirmative action as pit­
ting minority applicants against white applicants in a deep racial conflict. This Article is an 
attempt to explain and dispel that characterization. 
8. The intense competition among selective institutions for academically talented stu­
dents is a relatively recent phenomenon in American higher education, largely driven by 
economic, social, legal, and demographic forces that have conspired over the last century to 
make educational opportunity more desirable and more attainable for an expanding major­
ity of the citizenry. See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MERITOCRACY (1999). Until the mid-1900s, elite colleges such 
as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton "educated the solid, if less industrious, members of 
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counts for much of the moral outrage that affirmative action inspires 
among unsuccessful white applicants. It was widely reported, for ex­
ample, that what prompted Jennifer Gratz to become the lead plaintiff 
in a major test case challenging the University of Michigan's use of ra­
cial preferences in undergraduate admissions was her overriding sense 
that she had been displaced by less qualified minority applicants.9 Ob­
servers of politics will recall a 1990 television commercial that de­
picted the plight of applicants like Bakke and Gratz by showing a pair 
of white hands crumpling a letter informing the recipient he had lost a 
job to a minority applicant. "You needed that job," the voice-over 
said. "And you were the best qualified. But they had to give it to a mi­
nority because of a racial quota. Is that really fair?"10 Michael Lind, an 
otherwise thoughtful commentator on the subject, has said that "[i]n 
order to accommodate a few less-qualified black students, the Univer­
sity of Texas Law School, like other leading law schools, must tum 
down hundreds or thousands of academically superior white students 
America's upper-middle and upper classes, [then] almost exclusively WASP . . . .  Academic 
requirements were modest; students of good character who could pay the tuition were usu­
ally admitted." MARCIA GRAHAM SYNNOTI, THE HALF-OPENED DOOR: DISCRIMINATION 
AND ADMISSIONS AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON, 1900-1970, at 4 (1979). At 
Princeton, for example, " [i]n 1958, about 70 percent of alumni son applications were ac­
cepted for the class of 1962, as against only 35 percent of those without Princeton connec­
tions." Id. at 221. 
An alumni son was not required "to compete against non-Princeton sons," but was admitted 
if his "character record [was] satisfactory " and if the committee could answer just one major 
question in the affirmative: "Can he be expected to graduate?" The fruits of such preference 
were seen in the freshman class admitted in 1957: "50% of the bottom quarter, academically 
speaking, was made up of Princeton sons. " 
Id. ; see also id. at 206 (" [A]lumni sons, who were, on the whole, economically and socially 
upper-middle-class and 'scholastically average' . . .  made up about 20 percent of [Harvard's] 
class of 1951."). 
It is perhaps unremarkable that criticism of affirmative action has intensified as elite 
schools have become more selective. See, e.g. , Stanley Rothman & Amy E. Black, Who 
Rules Now? American Elites in the 1990s, SOC'Y, Sept. 1, 1998, at 17 (reporting survey result 
that "while in 1980, very few whites (less than one in twenty) expressed the view that minor­
ity gains came at the expense of whites, almost half our white respondents support that view 
now"). What is remarkable, however, is evidence that even with affirmative action, the aver­
age SAT score of black matriculants at selective schools in 1989 was higher than the average 
for all matriculants at such schools in 1951. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE 
SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE 
AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 30 (1998). Such data put the current affirmative action de­
bate into proper historical perspective. See id. ("The alumni/ae of the 1950s should have no 
reason to question the qualifications of the black students of today!"). 
9. Ethan Bronner, Group Suing U. of Michigan Over Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
1997, at  A24 ("I knew of people accepted to Ann Arbor who were less qualified, and my 
first reaction when I was rejected was, 'Let's sue,' . . . .  ") (quoting Jennifer Gratz); Jodi S. 
Cohen, Affirmative Action on Trial; Denial Shatters Dream; Southgate Woman Key Figure in 
University Bias Suit, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 12, 2000, at Al (profile of Jennifer Gratz); see 
also Kenneth J. Cooper, Deciding Who Gets In and Who Doesn't; Schools Consider Many 
Factors, From Grade Average to 'Get Up and Go', WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2000, at AS. 
10.  Peter Applebome, Subtly and Not, Race Bubbles Up as Issue in North Carolina 
Contest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1990, at Al (quoting television commercial). 
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every year."1 1 And a recent national survey confirms that affirmative 
action remains highly unpopular among whites in part because of per­
ceptions of increased competition with minorities for employment and 
educational opportunities.12 
· Yet the powerful appeal of the causation fallacy is all the more 
reason for courts and commentators to purge it from moral and legal 
discourse on affirmative action, especially as the current spate of anti­
affirmative action lawsuits percolates up to the Supreme Court. At its 
core, the fallacy erroneously conflates the magnitude of affirmative ac­
tion's instrumental benefit to minority applicants, which is large, with 
the magnitude of its instrumental cost to white applicants, which is 
small. While not the first to observe the arithmetic error at the root of 
the fallacy,13 this Article is the first to give the error a name, to expose 
the genesis of this error in Bakke, and to examine its implications for 
the standing of white plaintiffs and the merits of their claims. What 
this Article demonstrates is that the causation fallacy, by unduly mag­
nifying the practical harm suffered by white applicants, stands in the 
way of any rational effort to evaluate the fairness of affirmative action. 
At the outset, I wish to make clear what this Article does not do. It 
does not definitively resolve the constitutionality of affirmative action, 
nor does it prove the ultimate fairness or worthiness of affirmative ac-
11 .  MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION 166 (1995) (citing Lino Graglia, 
Racial Preferences in Admission to Institutions of Higher Education, in THE IMPERILED 
ACADEMY 134 (Howard Dickman ed., 1993)). The careful reader will note that Lind's asser­
tion flatly defies basic arithmetic. 
12. See Richard Morin, Misperceptions Cloud Whites' View of Blacks, WASH. POST, July 
11 ,  2001, at Al. This Article does not address affirmative action in the employment context. 
Instead, it focuses exclusively on the use of racial preferences in the admissions processes of 
selective colleges and universities. Although the Article's main statistical argument is appli­
cable to most educational contexts where race is a factor in selective admissions, its applica­
bility is more variable in the context of employment. The reason is that the relative magni­
tudes of the pertinent statistical parameters (e.g., spaces available, number of minority 
applicants, number of total applicants) are not as consistent across employment opportuni­
ties as they are across educational opportunities where race is a factor in selection. See infra 
note 76 (discussing evidence that race is a significant factor in admissions only at the most 
selective schools) . 
13. See, e.g., Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions, in 
THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 453-54 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 
1998); Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and 
the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381 , 422-23 n.192 (1998); Andrew 
Hacker, The Myths of Racial Division, GUARDIAN, May 1, 1992, at 19 (analyzing ANDREW 
HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992)) 
("(I]n the end black Americans remain a relatively small minority, so there are limits to how 
many whites they can displace even with aggressive affirmative action recruiting."); John 
Iwasaki, Affirmative Action Aids White Students Too; Stereotype False, State Study Says, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 19, 1995, at A9 ("(M]any white students who were 
denied admission did not lose out because of minority students, but because of tight limits on 
enrollment. In other words, many qualified white applicants probably would have been 
turned down even if no minority students had applied."); Gary Orfield, Boston Needs to 
Strengthen its Case for Diversity at Latin School, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11 ,  1999, at A15 
("[W]hites tend to overestimate what they actually 'lose' through affirmative action . . . .  "). 
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tion as a matter of social policy. Grand ambitions of this sort are diffi­
cult to accomplish given the strength of the arguments and the depth 
of feelings on both sides of the debate. At the same· time, I do not 
claim immunity from the pressure to be either "for" or "against" af­
firmative action;14 indeed, I have made no mystery of where my sym­
pathies lie.15 But this Article, by design, has a limited scope. I have 
chosen to focus on a specific strand of argument made by white appli­
cants who oppose racial preferences in an attempt to loosen the grip 
that argument has had on the affirmative action debate. My effort be­
gins with a showing that Bakke, as a story about how affirmative ac­
tion affects white applicants, is wrong both on its own facts and as a 
broadly representative narrative. That showing, which exposes the 
causation fallacy, does not conclusively resolve whether affirmative 
action is fair or unfair to white applicants. But it does enable us to en­
gage that question in more lucid, more rigorous, and less polarizing 
terms. 
This Article has four parts. Parts I and II demonstrate that the cau­
sation fallacy defies the basic arithmetic of selective admissions. My 
argument proceeds from one simple statistical truth: In any admissions 
process where applicants greatly outnumber admittees, and where 
white applicants greatly outnumber minority applicants, substantial 
preferences for minority applicants will not significantly diminish the 
odds of admission facing white applicants. Part I develops this argu­
ment by showing that the racial quota in Bakke, though a substantial 
benefit to minority applicants, was not likely the sole or even the pri­
mary reason for Bakke's rejection. His success in winning an order of 
admission from the Supreme Court, it turns out, was attributable not 
to the likelihood of his admission had there been no racial quota, but 
to a little-known procedural quirk barely acknowledged in Justice 
Powell's opinion and rarely if ever mentioned in commentary. Part II 
corroborates this analysis of Bakke with similar findings based on un­
dergraduate admissions data from William Bowen and Derek Bok's 
comprehensive study of affirmative action, The Shape of the River.16 
These findings and the logic behind them show that the admission of 
minority applicants and the rejection of white applicants are largely 
independent events, improperly linked through the causation fallacy. 
Parts III and IV examine the legal implications of dispelling the 
causation fallacy. Part III begins with the recognition that, absent the 
causation fallacy, white applicants have legitimate grounds for claim-
14. See Anthony T. Kronrnan, ls Diversity a Value in American Higher Education?, 52 
FLA. L. REV. 861, 862 (2000) (noting the difficulty of "sustain[ing] an intermediate position 
that is sympathetic and skeptical at once" in light of "the pressure to be 'for' or 'against' af­
firmative action without reservation"). ·  
15. See Liu, supra note 13. 
16. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8. 
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ing that affirmative action prevents them from competing on an equal 
footing with minority applicants. Such a claim, which is distinct from a 
claim of displacement, establishes a cognizable equal protection in­
jury. Importantly, however, not all white applicants are positioned to 
raise an equal-footing claim. When the mechanics of selective admis­
sions are analyzed at the level of individual applicants, it becomes 
clear that a substantial number of unsuccessful white applicants 
(somewhere close to half in Bowen and Bok's study) are too weak to 
be admitted even when placed on an equal footing with minority ap­
plicants. Because the failure of those applicants to gain admission has 
nothing to do with race, they lack standing to challenge affirmative ac­
tion. Among the remaining white applicants, all have standing to raise 
an equal-footing claim, but under current law, most are not entitled to 
sue for damages or other retrospective relief. Only the tiniest fraction 
of unsuccessful white applicants genuinely conforms to the Bakke nar­
rative, and there is reason to believe that such highly qualified appli­
cants make unlikely plaintiffs. 
Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the causation fallacy 
for evaluating the constitutional merits of affirmative action. Because 
strict scrutiny takes into account the nature and severity of the burden 
that affirmative action imposes on white applicants, it is essential to 
characterize that burden accurately, without the distorting influence of 
the causation fallacy. Moreover, exposing the causation fallacy has the 
salutary effect of centering the merits inquiry on whether white appli­
cants are improperly stereotyped, not displaced, by affirmative action. 
Claims of displacement tend to inflate the degree of racial conflict in­
herent in race-conscious admissions, thereby heightening the pressure 
to be "for" or "against" affirmative action. In contrast, the stereotyp­
ing concern defuses the tendency toward polarization by relating the 
fairness of affirmative action to the concrete workings of particular 
policies. 
I. BAKKE REVISITED 
Let us begin with a familiar story. In 1973, a white student named 
Allan Bakke applied unsuccessfully for admission to the Davis 
Medical School at the University of California. Bakke reapplied in 
1974 and was again turned down. At the time, the medical school en­
rolled 100 new students each year and operated a two-track admis­
sions process consisting of a general admissions program, under which 
Bakke's application was reviewed, and a special admissions program, 
under which various minority applicants could seek review.17 The spe-
17. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 274-76 (1978) (opinion of Powell, 
J.). The medical school's formal policy indicated that any applicant who identified herself or 
himself as "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged" could seek review under the 
special admissions program. Id. at 272 n.l. In fact, large numbers of disadvantaged whites 
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cial program screened minority applicants to fill a quota; it continually 
recommended applicants to the general admissions committee until 
sixteen were admitted.18 Before the Supreme Court, Bakke argued 
that the "racial quota . . .  prevented [him] from competing for 16 of 
the 100 places at the Davis Medical School and, as a result, barred him 
- by reason of race alone - from attending the school."19 
Justice Powell agreed. As a preface to Bakke's legal claims, Justice 
Powell observed that " [i]n both years, applicants were admitted under 
the special program with grade point averages, [Medical College Ad­
mission Test] scores, and bench mark scores significantly lower than 
Bakke's."20 To make this clear, he dropped a footnote showing the 
following table:21 
CLASS ENTERING IN 1974 
Verbal Quant. Science 
Science Overall MCAT MCAT MCAT 
GPA GPA {%ile} {%ile} {%ile} 
Bakke 3.44 3.46 96 94 97 
Regular 
3.36 3.29 69 67 82 admittees 
Special 
2.42 2.62 34 30 37 admittees 
After finding the quota unconstitutional, Justice Powell affirmed 
the California Supreme Court's judgment ordering Bakke's admis­
sion.22 The medical school had chosen not to contest Bakke's admissi­
bility absent the quota,23 and Justice Powell noted that "[h]ere . . .  
there is no question as to the sole reason for respondent's rejection -
purposeful racial discrimination in the form of the special admissions 
applied to the special program. Id. at 275 n.5. No whites, however, were ever admitted 
through the special program. Id. at 276 & n.6. 
18. Competition within the special program was substantial. Even discounting the dis­
advantaged white applicants in the pool, the special program admitted only 7 .1 % of minority 
applicants (sixteen out of 224) in 1973 and only 3.5% of minority applicants (sixteen out of 
456) in 1974. Id. at 275 n.5. 
19. Brief for Respondent at 63, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) 
(No. 76-811). 
20. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277. 
21. See id. at 277 n.7. Allan Bakke also applied unsuccessfully in 1973 , and the footnote 
includes a second table showing similar data for the class entering in 1973. The two tables in 
footnote 7 include a sixth column titled "Gen. Infor." I have omitted it because Justice 
Powell nowhere explains or relies on the data in this column. 
22. Id. at 320. 
23. Id. 
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program."24 In other words, affirmative action cost Bakke his seat at 
the Davis Medical School. 
What, if anything, is wrong with this story? 
A. An Introduction to the Causation Fallacy 
However neat and intelligible, the conventional rendition of Bakke 
defies common sense. The reason is clear upon a closer look at the ta­
ble in Justice Powell's footnote. That table unambiguously shows that 
Bakke's academic qualifications were far better than those of the av­
erage special admittee. His MCAT scores placed him roughly in the 
top 5 %  of test-takers, whereas the average scores of the special admit­
tees placed them in the bottom third.25 Likewise, his science grade 
point average was more than one full point (one letter grade) higher 
than the average of the special admittees.26 These large gaps strongly 
suggest that the special program afforded minority applicants a sub-
. stantial preference in admissions.27 
However, although Justice Powell notes these "significant[ ]" dis­
parities,28.he fails to point out what I find to be the most striking in­
formation in the table: Bakke's grade point averages and MCAT 
scores in 1974 were not only far better than those of the special admit­
tees, but also significantly better than those of the regular admittees. 
Indeed, Bakke's academic indicators were high by any measure and, 
importantly, higher than those of the majority of applicants who 
gained admission under the regular program.29 
How did these applicants get in ahead of Bakke? Clearly, the 
medical school admitted students not only on the basis of grades and 
test scores, but also on the basis of other factors relevant to the study 
and practice of medicine - effective communication skills, demon­
strated compassion, commitment to a particular field of research, and 
perhaps others. From Justice Powell's opinion, we do not learn exactly 
what qualities the regular admittees had that Bakke lacked, although 
Justice Powell noted that the chairman of the admissions committee, 
who interviewed Bakke in 1974, "found Bakke 'rather limited in his 
approach' to the problems of the medical profession and found dis­
turbing Bakke's 'very definite opinions which were based more on his 
24. Id. at 321 n.54. 
25. See id. at 277 n.7. 
26. Id. 
27. But cf infra text accompanying notes 83-86 (discussing why the use of averages to 
infer the magnitude of preference accorded to minority applicants is not entirely valid). 
28. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277. 
29. Id. at 277 n.7. Although the grade point averages and test scores of regular admittees 
in footnote 7 are means, not medians, I think it is reasonable to assume that the admittees 
are normally distributed around each mean. 
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personal viewpoints than upon a study of the total problem.' "30 The 
point is that many reasons, apart from racial preferences, might ex­
plain Bakke's failure to achieve a more competitive position relative 
to the fifty or more regular admittees with grades and test scores lower 
than his.31 
To be sure, the sixteen-seat set-aside lowered Bakke's chance of 
admission. But by how much? One rudimentary way to think about 
this question is to compare (a) Bakke's likelihood of admission as an 
applicant for only the eighty-four seats available through the regular 
admissions program with (b) his likelihood of admission had he been 
able to compete for all 100 seats in the entering class. To simplify the 
comparison, let us assume that none of the special applicants would 
have been admitted ahead of any of the regular applicants.32 In 1974, 
Bakke was one of 3109 regular applicants to the Davis Medical 
School.33 With the racial quota, the average likelihood of admission 
among regular applicants was 2.7% (eighty-four seats divided by 3109 
applicants). With no racial quota, the average likelihood of admission 
would have been 3.2% (100 seats divided by 3109 applicants).34 In 
30. Id. at 277 (quoting the record). 
31 .  Neither Justice Powell's opinion nor the litigation record indicates exactly how many 
regular admittees had grades and test scores lower than Bakke's. Using the number of regu­
lar admittees who matriculated (eighty-four) as a lower bound for the number of regular ap­
plicants who were admitted, and assuming that the grade point averages and test scores of 
regular admittees are normally distributed around the mean, I estimate that fifty or sixty 
regular admittees, at a minimum, had grades and test scores lower than Bakke's. The true 
number is certainly much higher, because not all admittees choose to matriculate. But I am 
unable to estimate the true number reliably without knowing either the total number of ap­
plicants admitted under the regular program or the percentage of admittees who decided to 
matriculate. 
32. This assumption is improbable despite the large gaps in average GPAs and MCAT 
scores between special and regular admittees. Special applicants at the high end of their dis­
tribution likely had GPAs and test scores at least as high as, if not higher than, those of 
regular applicants at the low end of their distribution. Indeed, the record shows that, 
whereas Bakke had an overall GPA of 3.46 and a science GPA of 3.44, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
277 n.7, the overall GPA of special admittees ranged up to 3.76 in 1973 and up to 3.45 in 
1974, and the science GPA of special admittees ranged up to 3.89 in 1974, see Brief of Amici 
Curiae National Urban League et al. at 12 n.6, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, No. 76-811 
(U.S. filed Jan. 14, 1977) (on petition for writ of certiorari) (hereinafter Amici National 
Urban League). The assumption that none of the special applicants would have been admit­
ted under the regular program thus establishes an upper bound for the cost of affirmative 
action to regular applicants like Bakke. 
33. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 273 n.2 (noting that 3737 applications were submitted for the 
1974 entering class); id. at 275 n.S (noting that 628 persons applied to the special committee 
in 1974). 3737 - 628 = 3,109. 
34. I describe this comparison as rudimentary because it does not account for the fact 
that the medical school had to admit more than 84 or 100 applicants in order to obtain a 
"yield" of 84 or 100 matriculants. In other words, the average admission rates for white ap­
plicants - i.e., the likelihood of receiving a letter of admission - were higher than my 
rough calculations show, both with and without the quota. But without knowing the total 
number of admittees or the yield rates for the medical school, see supra note 31, I am unable 
to offer a more precise calculation. Part II of this Article, which examines undergraduate 
admissions data, provides a much more refined iteration of this method of statistical com-
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other words, the quota increased the average likelihood of rejection 
among regular applicants from 96.8% to 97.3%. 
Admittedly, this comparison is somewhat artificial because Bakke 
was clearly not an average applicant. However weak his interview may 
have been, his test scores and grade point averages gave him a sub­
stantial edge over the majority of regular applicants. We do not know 
exactly how much the admissions committee had narrowed the regular 
applicant pool before rejecting Bakke, but we do know that Bakke re­
ceived an interview and that, under the regular admissions program, 
"[a]bout one out of six applicants was invited for a personal inter­
view."35 Thus, Bakke was one of roughly 520 regular applicants inter­
viewed (3109 divided by six). Among these highly qualified applicants, 
the average rate of admission with the racial quota in place was 16.2% 
(eighty-four seats divided by 520 applicants). Without the quota, the 
average rate of admission would have been 19.2% (100 seats divided 
by 520 applicants). 
Of course, with additional criteria, it may be possible to narrow 
down Bakke's competition to a small enough number that the effect of 
the quota turns out to be substantial. The point, however, is that with­
out precise information about how Bakke's application fared in the 
overall pool - and Justice Powell's opinion provides none - no rea­
sonable basis exists to infer that the racial quota, and not some other 
selection criterion, caused his application to be rejected. In a selection 
process where there are far more applicants than available opportuni­
ties, the likelihood of success for any candidate is low, even under 
race-neutral criteria. Reserving a small number of seats for minority 
applicants, relative to the total number of seats, will not decrease that 
low likelihood very much. Based on the data in Justice Powell's opin­
ion, the most reasonable inference is that affirmative action did not 
appreciably affect Bakke's chance of admission. 
B. Discrimination Based on Race? 
Apart from its small size, the special admissions program had an­
other feature that, while not typical of affirmative action policies in 
general, underscores the illogic of the causal narrative in Bakke. Al­
though we have come to understand Davis's special program as a 
paradigmatic racial quota, the fact is that the program was officially 
designed to accord admissions preferences not on the basis of race, but 
on the basis of economic or educational disadvantage.36 In the trial 
court, the chairman of the admissions committee described the special 
parison, including adjustments for yield. See infra Part II. 
35. Id. at 273-74. 
36. Id. at 274-75 & n.4. 
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program as an effort to " 'give[] preference to applicants from disad­
vantaged backgrounds, [using] minority group status as one factor in 
determining relative disadvantage,' "37 and Justice Powell's opinion 
notes that seventy-three of the 297 special applicants in 1973 were 
white, and that 172 of the 628 special applicants in 1974 were white.38 
Yet no white student was ever admitted through the special program39 
- a fact that prompted the trial court to opine, correctly in my view, 
that "a white student who had applied for the special program and 
been refused purely on the basis of his race would have been in a 
much stronger position to question this practice than the plaintiff."40 
Bakke, the trial court found, "did not apply to [the] special program as 
a disadvantaged student,"41 and he never claimed in his lawsuit that he 
qualified as disadvantaged. 
It is thus doubly surprising that Bakke succeeded in attributing his 
failure to gain admission to racial discrimination. Not only is there no 
sound basis for inferring that the sixteen-seat set-aside caused Bakke's 
rejection, there is also no basis for believing that Bakke was excluded 
from the special program based on his race as opposed to his lack of 
disadvantage. Justice Powell, finding it was not "fatal to Bakke's 
standing that he was not a 'disadvantaged' applicant,'' determined that 
"[ d]espite the program's purported emphasis on disadvantage, it was a 
minority enrollment program with a secondary disadvantage ele­
ment. "42 But disadvantaged white applicants were allowed to apply 
and did apply to the special program, and "[a]pplicants from mi­
norit[y] [groups] but non-disadvantaged backgrounds [were] referred 
to the regular admissions process. "43 Had Bakke claimed disadvantage 
and applied to the special program, he would have had a legitimate 
claim of race discrimination. Yet on the facts of his case, Bakke's 
claim of race discrimination seems inapposite. Being nonwhite by it­
self would not have qualified him for special consideration, and Bakke 
adduced no facts indicating that he was economically or educationally 
disadvantaged. In short, Bakke's exclusion from the special program 
37. Notice of Intended Decision at 87a, Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Nov. 25, 1974) (No. 31287) (on file with author) (quoting Dr. George H. Lowrey) [here­
inafter Intended Decision]. The Intended Decision is reproduced in the appendix to the uni­
versity's petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, No. 76-811 (U.S. filed Dec. 14, 1976) (on file with author). The page citations refer to 
that appendix. 
38. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275 n.5. 
39. Id. at 276. 
40. Intended Decision, supra note 37, at 94a. 
41. Id. 
42. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281 n.14 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
43. Intended Decision, supra note 37, at 88a. In fact, as Justice Powell acknowledged, 
fifteen minority applicants were admitted through the regular program in 1973, and nine 
were admitted through the regular  program in 1974. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276 n.6. 
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was no more a consequence of racial discrimination than it was a con­
sequence of discrimination on the basis of disadvantage. 
C. The Real Story of Allan Bakke's Admission to the 
Davis Medical School 
Assuming that Bakke stated a valid claim of race discrimination, it 
remains difficult to see how Justice Powell could have concluded that 
there was "no question" that the sixteen-seat set-aside was the "sole 
reason" for Bakke's rejection.44 As shown above, the sheer numerical 
parameters of the admissions process and the relevance of selection 
criteria other than grades and test scores do not support that conclu­
sion. It must be remembered, however, that Justice Powell reached his 
conclusion only after observing that the medical school "ha[d] con­
ceded that it could not carry its burden of proving that, but for the ex­
istence of its unlawful special admissions program, [Bakke] still would 
not have been admitted. "45 This raises an important question: If the 
statistical analysis above is at all compelling, then why did the univer­
sity concede the issue of Bakke's likelihood of admission absent af­
firmative action? Did the reservation of sixteen seats actually affect 
Bakke's odds of admission to a much greater extent than my statistical 
argument suggests? The answer, it turns out, makes for an interesting 
tale about the university's litigation strategy but does nothing to shore 
up the fallacy in Bakke's causal argument. 
In his original complaint in state court, Bakke sought an injunction 
"directing defendants to admit plaintiff to said Medical School."46 The 
university's answer asserted unequivocally: "Petitioner was not denied 
admission to the Davis Medical School as a result of the operation of 
the special admissions program at said school. Petitioner would not 
have been admitted to said school even if there had been no such spe­
cial admissions program."47 After a bench trial, the state court con­
cluded that the special admissions program was unconstitutional but 
declined to order Bakke's admission.48 The trial court's findings of fact 
state that in both 1973 and 1974 "[p]laintiff would not have been ac­
cepted for admission . . .  even if there had been no special admissions 
44. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 n.54. 
45. Id. at 320. 
46. Complaint at 4, Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (Cal. Super. Ct. June 20, 1974) 
(No. 31287) (on file with author). 
47. First Amended Answer at 7, Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 
1, 1974) (No. 31287) (on file with author). 
48. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 117a, Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of 
Cal. (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 1975) (No. 31287) (on file with author). The Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law are reproduced in the appendix to the university's petition for cer­
tiorari, and the page numbers refer to that appendix. 
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program."49 In support of this finding, the court noted that Bakke "was 
not put on the alternate list" in 1973 or 1974, that "few of those on the 
alternate list were accepted" in either year, and that in 1974 thirty-two 
applicants with ratings higher than Bakke's, including twenty on the 
alternate list, had not been admitted.so Moreover, the chairman of the 
admissions committee, Dr. George Lowrey, had testified that "Mr. 
Bakke would not have been admitted in either year even if there had 
been no special admissions program."s1 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court agreed that the special 
admissions program was unconstitutional.s2 The court additionally 
held, however, that the trial court should have assigned the university, 
not Bakke, the burden of proof on the issue whether Bakke would 
have been admitted absent the special program.s3 Facing a remand on 
that issue,s4 the university filed a petition for rehearing in which it 
stipulated that it would not attempt to meet its burden of proof.ss 
While stating - contrary to its earlier position and contrary to the 
trial court's findings - that "Mr. Bakke was a highly qualified appli­
cant and came extremely close to admission in 1973 even with the spe­
cial admissions program being in operation,"s6 the university went on 
to offer the following explanation for its stipulation: 
Further, in the event [the California Supreme Court] adheres to its deci­
sion on the constitutional issue, the University has a strong interest in ob­
taining review by the United States Supreme Court of the question of 
whether the special admissions program at the Davis Medical School and 
other similar programs are . . .  unconstitutional. It is far more important 
for the University to obtain the most authoritative decision possible on the 
legality of its admissions process than to argue over whether Mr. Bakke 
would or would not have been admitted in the absence of the special ad­
missions program. A remand to the trial court for determination of that 
factual issue might delay and perhaps prevent review of the constitutional 
issue by the United States Supreme Court.s7 
49. Id. at 116a-117a. 
50. Id. at 116a. 
51. Intended Decision, supra note 37, at 108a (quoting Dr. Lowrey). 
52. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1172 (Cal. 1976). 
53. Id. 
54. In its original disposition of the case, the California Supreme Court said: "[W]e re­
mand the case to the trial court for the purpose of determining, under the proper allocation 
of the burden of proof, whether Bakke would have been admitted to the 1973 or 1974 en­
tering class absent the special admission program." Compare Bakke, 553 P.2d at 1172, with 
Modification of Opinion at 80a, Bakke, 553 P.2d 1152 (S.F. 23311) (Cal. Oct. 28, 1976). The 
Modification of Opinion is reproduced in the appendix to the university's petition for certio­
rari, and the page number refers to that appendix. 
55. Petition for Rehearing at 11, Bakke, 553 P.2d 1152 (S.F. 23311) (Cal. Sept. 30, 1976). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added). 
1058 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 1 00:1045 
The California Supreme Court accepted the stipulation and, instead of 
remanding the case to the trial court, amended its disposition of the 
case to state that Bakke "is entitled to an order that he be admitted to 
the University. "58 
The record of litigation thus shows that the university's concession 
was a last-minute switch on the eve of seeking certiorari. Eager for a 
definitive resolution of the constitutional issue, the university candidly 
acknowledged that proof of Bakke's inadmissibility might cast doubt 
on his standing and, in turn, the Supreme Court's Article III jurisdic­
tion.59 Indeed, when the university filed its petition for certiorari, a 
coalition of fifteen civil rights groups, bar associations, and unions 
submitted an amicus brief opposing certiorari on the ground that the 
university's stipulation was "an [ e ]ffort to [f]abricate [j]urisdiction" in 
the Supreme Court.ro As that brief makes clear, ample facts were 
available to the university to show that Bakke would have been denied 
admission in 1973 and 1974 even if all sixteen seats in the special pro­
gram had been available. In 1973, at the time Bakke applied, fifteen 
regular applicants had numerical ratings higher than Bakke's, and 
among the twenty regular applicants with ratings equal to Bakke's, 
some were put on a waiting list, yet Bakke was not.61 In 1974, twenty 
applicants were on the waiting list (again, Bakke was not), and twelve 
additional applicants not on the waiting list had numerical ratings 
higher than Bakke's.62 Thus, in both years, more than sixteen appli­
cants had priority over Bakke.63 
58. Bakke, 553 P.2d at 1 172; Modification of Opinion, supra note 54, at 80a. 
59. The university had reason to be concerned about justiciability. Just three years be­
fore Bakke reached the Supreme Court, the Court dismissed as moot a similar lawsuit 
against the University of Washington Law School. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 
(1974). Moreover, a mere six months before the university filed its petition for certiorari, the 
Court had held that, absent a showing that "plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is 
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision," a federal court lacks Article III jurisdiction. 
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). 
60. Amici National Urban League, supra note 32, at 13. 
61. Id. at 11-12. The numerical ratings, called "benchmark scores," were composite rat­
ings of "the interviewers' summaries, the candidate's overall grade point average, grade 
point average in science courses, scores on the [MCAT], letters of recommendation, extra­
curricular activities, and other biographical data." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 274 (1978). 
62. See Amici National Urban League, supra note 32, at 12. 
63. The university made several arguments in response, none of them convincing. See 
Reply to Brief of Amici Curiae at 2-4, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, No. 76-811 (U.S. 
filed Jan. 21, 1977) (on petition for writ of certiorari) [hereinafter Reply]. First, it pointed 
out that "some offers of admission are declined" and that "the notion of inflexible 'priority' 
is itself inaccurate, for benchmark ratings were not wholly determinative of admission." Id. 
But these arguments are refuted by the testimony of Dr. Lowrey, the admissions committee 
chairman, who consistently maintained that Bakke would have been denied admission ab­
sent the quota. See Intended Decision, supra note 37, at 108a; Amici National Urban 
League, supra note 32, at 11 .  Dr. Lowrey explained that " ' [a]lmost every applicant offered a 
place in the class after the middle of May [when Bakke's application was being considered] 
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The university's strategic move garnered little attention at the 
Supreme Court. Noting that "[s]everal amici suggest that Bakke lacks 
standing," Justice Powell simply stated without explanation that the 
university's stipulation was "not an attempt . . .  to disguise actual facts 
of record,"64 a conclusion difficult to square with the available evi­
dence. He went on to clarify that "the University's decision not to 
permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in the class" was a suffi­
cient injury to establish standing "even if Bakke had been unable to 
prove that he would have been admitted in the absence of the special 
program."65 Yet this determination does not render the university's 
maneuver less suspect, for the university never advanced this theory of 
standing before the Supreme Court. It relied instead on the validity of 
its stipulation.66 Justice Powell reached his conclusion about standing 
on his own, and the issue was not addressed by any other Justice in 
Bakke. 
attends the medical school,' " and he plainly characterized the fifteen applicants with 
benchmark ratings higher than Bakke's in 1973 as being "ahead of Mr. Bakke." Amici Na­
tional Urban League, supra note 32, at 11 (quoting Dr. Lowrey). 
The university also cited a statement by the trial court that " ' there appears to the court 
to be at least a possibility that [Bakke] might have been admitted absent the 16 favored posi­
tions on behalf of minorities.' " Reply, supra, at 3 (quoting Intended Decision, supra note 37, 
at 108a). But the university lifted this statement from a discussion in which the trial court 
concluded that Bakke would not have been admitted absent the special program, see In­
tended Decision, supra note 37, at 107a-108a, a conclusion unequivocally restated by the trial 
court twice thereafter, see Addendum to Notice of Intended Decision, Bakke v. Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 1975) (No. 31287) (on file with author); Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 48, at 116a-ll 7a. 
Finally, the university cited a report written by Dr. Lowrey in response to a Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare inquiry. The report said: 
Mr. Bakke was found by the Admissions Committee to be a highly desirable candidate and 
came very close to being offered a place in the entering class for the fall of 1973. The single 
reason for his non-acceptance was the lack of available space in that group; had additional 
places been available, individuals with Mr. Bakke's rating would likely have been admit­
ted . . . .  
Reply, supra, at  4 n.2 (quoting report). B ut the reference to "that group" is a reference to 
"the entering class for the fall of 1973"; i t  is not a reference to the regular admissions pro­
gram. The very most that could be inferred from the report's unremarkable citation to "the 
Jack of available space" is that Bakke was in line for the l Olst seat, not the 85th. 
In sum, it was far from "an impossible burden,'' Reply, supra, at 4, to show Bakke's in­
admissibility absent the quota by a preponderance of the evidence. The record supports the 
charge that "the University essentially gave up an air tight case in order to confer 'j urisdic­
tion' on [the Supreme] Court." Amici National Urban League, supra note 32, at 16. 
64. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280 n.14. 
65. Id. at 280-81 n.14. 
66. In i ts reply to amici's concerns about standing, the university asserted that " the law 
does not require certainty of admission in order to establish standing." Reply, supra note 63, 
at 2 (emphasis added). But nowhere did the university argue that the denial of opportunity 
to compete for all 100 places was alone sufficient to establish standing. Rather, the university 
argued that Bakke's inadmissibility absent the racial quota was not a certainty, see id. at 2-3, 
and was sufficiently probable that attempting to prove otherwise would have amounted to 
" trying to carry an impossible burden,'' id. at 4. 
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In sum, Allan Bakke's admission to the Davis Medical School was 
a quirk, a result orchestrated in the course of litigation based on con­
siderations unrelated to the merits of his causal claim. From the record 
of the lawsuit, the point worth emphasizing is not so much the ultimate 
fact of Bakke's inadmissibility absent the special program. The point, 
rather, is that Bakke's admissibility absent the special program would 
have been exceptional, and the university's concession provides no 
reason to believe otherwise. Bakke vindicated his claim that the "ra­
cial quota . . .  barred him - by reason of race alone - from attending 
the school"67 not only against the facts, but more importantly against 
overwhelming odds. For many unsuccessful white applicants, Bakke's 
example legitimizes the instinct - against all odds - to blame af­
firmative action. In this way, Bakke gives life to the causation fallacy. 
But with a careful look beneath the surface, we see the fallacy laid 
bare. 
II. THE BASIC ARITHMETIC OF SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS 
As a legal ma.tter, Bakke held unlawful the voluntary use of racial 
quotas in selective admissions.68 Yet the Court did not ban all uses of 
race in admissions. In his opinion announcing the judgment of the 
Court, Justice Powell famously pronounced that colleges and universi­
ties may use race as one of many "plus" factors in admissions in order 
to assemble a diverse student body.69 Although the status of Justice 
Powell's opinion as legal authority is contested,70 the notion of race as 
a "plus" factor has served for over twenty years as an organizing prin­
ciple for the institutional practice and public understanding of affirma­
tive action. The gold standard for such practice, according to Justice 
Powell, is the admissions program used by Harvard College, where 
"the race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor just as geo-
67. Brief for Respondent at 63, Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. 265 (1978) 
(No. 76-811). 
68. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-16, 319-20 (opinion of Powell, J.) (finding the quota unconsti­
tutional); id. at 412-18, 421 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (finding the quota unlawful under 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
69. Id. at 316-18 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
70. Compare Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) 
("Justice Powell's analysis is the narrowest footing upon which a race-conscious decision 
making process could stand" and is therefore the holding of the Court under Marks v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)), with Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) 
("Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never represented 
the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case . . . .  Justice Powell's view in 
Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue."). 
March 2002] The Causation Fallacy 1061 
graphic origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the balance in other 
candidates' cases."71 
The appeal of this approach is readily understood in light of the 
conventional narrative of Bakke. Whereas racial quotas put a specified 
number of seats beyond the reach of white applicants, the use of race 
to "tip the balance" in close cases seems to impose a comparatively 
minor detriment. Quotas are bad, the argument goes, because they are 
rigid and because they expressly limit the number of opportunities for 
which white applicants may compete. In contrast, the plus-factor ap­
proach is flexible. It enables every applicant to compete for all ·avail­
able seats in the class. And against a baseline of objective qualifica­
tions, it places racial and nonracial plus factors "on the same footing 
for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same 
weight."72 Justice Powell's opinion tells us that Bakke was right to be­
lieve that the medical school's racial quota cost him a letter of admis­
sion. Unlike Bakke, however, 
[t]he applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candi­
date receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic background will not have 
been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because he 
was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It would mean only 
that his combined qualifications, which may have included similar non­
objective factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant.73 
In other words, when race is used as a plus factor, affirmative action 
cannot be said to have caused the rejection of a white applicant. Al­
though race may be a pivotal factor at the end, it is only a minor con­
sideration - a factor that "tips the balance" - against the backdrop 
of the objective and nonobjective "combined qualifications" of each 
white and minority applicant. So goes the conventional answer to the 
conventional framing of the problem in Bakke: Because the use of 
race in the form of a quota is understood to impose a heavy burden on 
white applicants like Bakke, the solution is to limit the use of race by 
reducing it to a mere tipping factor in close cases. 
But this framing of the solution, no less than the framing of the 
problem, does not correspond to empirical reality. The practice and 
effects of affirmative action are not as transparent now as they were 
before Bakke made quotas illegal.74 But recent scholarship and litiga­
tion provide important insights that are indicative of general tenden-
71. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 (quoting description of Harvard College admissions pro-
gram). 
72. /d. at 317. 
73. Id. at 318. 
74. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Cooper, Colleges Testing New Diversity Initiatives: Success Is 
Uneven Without Traditional Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2000, at A4 (observing 
that more and more institutions are revising their admissions policies in response to changes 
in the legal and political landscape). 
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cies.75 Perhaps the most notable contribution in this vein is The Shape 
of the River by William Bowen and Derek Bok, a comprehensive, lon­
gitudinal study of admissions, academic and employment outcomes, 
attitudes, and life experiences of over 80,000 black and white students 
who studied at twenty-eight selective colleges and universities.76 Al­
though Bowen and Bok's study, like all social science, is not perfect,77 
it is powerful enough to confirm, as we shall see, that race continues to 
play a major role in the admission of minority applicants, certainly a 
much larger role than the image of a tipping factor suggests. 
75. For recent scholarship, see, for example, Kane, supra note 13, at 431; Fredrick E. 
Vars & William G. Bowen, Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores, Race, and Academic Perform­
ance in Selective Colleges and Universities, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra 
note 13, at 457; Robert C. Davidson & Ernest L. Lewis, Affirmative Action and Other Special 
Consideration Admissions at the University of California, Davis, School of Medicine, 278 
JAMA 1153 (1997); William C. Kidder, The Rise of the Testocracy: An Essay on the LSAT, 
Conventional Wisdom, and the Dismantling of Diversity, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 167 (2000); 
Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997); and Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Ac­
tion: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1996) . In addition, the University 
of Michigan litigation has yielded an impressive collection of empirical research demon­
strating the relation between racial diversity and educational goals. See The Compelling 
Need for Diversity in Higher Education at, http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/ 
expert/index.html (last modified Feb. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Compelling Need]. 
76. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8. The data in the study come from a huge database 
called College and Beyond (C&B), built by the Andrew Mellon Foundation between 1994 
and 1997. Id. at xxvii-xxx. The C&B database contains records of 80,000 undergraduate stu­
dents who matriculated at twenty-eight selective colleges and universities in 1951, 1976 and 
1989. Id. at xxvii-xxviii. The institutions include liberal arts colleges as well as research uni­
versities. Id. at xxviii-xxix (listing the twenty-eight schools). Eight were among the top 
twenty most selective schools in the nation, as measured by average SAT scores; another 
thirteen were among the fifty-three next most selective schools; and the remaining seven 
were among the 241 next most selective schools. Id. at xxix. Although the twenty-eight 
schools are not representative of American higher education, they are representative of the 
roughly 300 most selective schools in the country. Id. For purposes of studying affirmative 
action, this is a highly relevant sample given the fact that racial preferences "are most pro­
nounced at the most selective colleges." Kane, supra note 13, at 436-38 (showing through 
empirical analysis that race plays little or no role in admissions decisions at the vast majority 
of undergraduate institutions). The C&B database follows the students at these institutions 
before, during, and after they attend college, yielding a rich array of data and sufficiently 
large sample sizes to permit reliable comparisons among various groupings of students and 
institutions. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at xxix-xxx. Although the study does not ex­
amine minority students other than blacks, the data come from years (1951, 1976 and 1989) 
in which blacks were the primary beneficiaries of affirmative action. 
77. For critical reviews, see Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on 
The Shape of the River, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1583 (1999); Clifford Adelman, The Rest of the 
River, u. Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 42; and THREE VIEWS OF THE RIVER (Center for Equal 
Opportunity ed., 1998), at http://www.ceousa.org/html/bok.html (Nov. 1998) (reviews by 
Linda Chavez, Dave O'Neill and Roger Clegg). For more favorable reviews, see Ronald 
Dworkin, Affirming Affirmative Action, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 22, 1998, at 91; Michael 
Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697 (1999). A nicely balanced cri­
tique is offered by Terrance Sandal ow, Minority Preferences Reconsidered, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
1874 (1999). 
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Yet even if the concept of race as a tipping factor is more rhetoric 
than reality, that realization provides no basis for suspecting that racial 
preferences significantly hinder white applicants' chances of success, 
as the racial quota in Bakke purportedly did. The latter concern is, as 
it was in Bakke, a direct consequence of the causation fallacy. Justice 
Powell's distinction between racial quotas and the plus-factor ap­
proach has always aroused suspicion,78 and there is little reason to be 
invested in it once the causation fallacy is unraveled. As I explain be� 
low, the asymmetry that characterizes the effect of racial quotas in 
Bakke also characterizes the effect of affirmative action policies in 
general. Affirmative action, while significantly benefiting minority ap­
plicants, does not significantly burden white applicants. 
A. The Admissions Advantage for Minority Applicants 
The most common approach to quantifying the degree of prefer­
ence afforded by affirmative action is to compare average test scores 
of white and minority applicants.79 Bowen and Bok's study shows that 
although the black-white gap in SAT scores has narrowed considera­
bly over the past three decades, especially at selective institutions,80 it 
remains quite large. At the five institutions for which Bowen and Bok 
had the most detailed admissions data,81 the average SAT score for 
1989 black matriculants was 1157, while the average for white ma-
78. Justice Powell might be said to have invited the suspicion by writing, somewhat eva-
sively, that his plus-factor approach 
is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular 
qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, 
although not necessarily according them the same weight. Indeed, the weight attributed to a 
particular quality may vary from year to year depending upon the "mix" both of the student 
body and the applicants for the incoming class. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added). The first to doubt Justice 
Powell's approach was not a judicial or political conservative; it was Justice Brennan. In 
Bakke, he wrote: 
There is no sensible, and certainly no constitutional, distinction between, for example, add­
ing a set number of points to the admissions rating of disadvantaged minority applicants as 
an expression of the preference with the expectation that this will result in the admission of 
an approximately determined number of qualified minority applicants and setting a fixed 
number of places for such applicants as was done here. 
Id. at 378 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
79. For well-known examples of this approach, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277 n.7 (opinion 
of Powell, J.); RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: 
INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 449-68 (1994); and STEPHAN 
THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, 
INDIVISIBLE 397-409 (1997). 
80. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 20-22, 30-31 & figs.2.6, 2.7. 
81. The five institutions include three private universities and two co-ed liberal arts col­
leges, "roughly representative" of the larger universe of twenty-eight selective four-year 
colleges and universities they examined in their study. Id. at 17 n.4. Bowen and Bok did not 
identify these schools because of promises of confidentiality. See id. 
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triculants was 133182 - a difference of 174 points, or more than one 
standard deviation. This gap provides some evidence of the effect of 
racial preferences. 
Importantly, however, racial preferences explain only some of the 
gap. Although it is tempting to conclude that affirmative action is re­
sponsible for the entire test score gap, that conclusion would be a mis­
take. In addition to racial preferences, the gap in average SAT scores 
of black versus white matriculants directly reflects the gap in average 
SAT scores of black versus white applicants.83 Compared to whites 
who apply to selective institutions, blacks are underrepresented at 
higher SAT levels and overrepresented at lower SAT levels relative to 
their proportion in the applicant pool.84 This means that even if selec­
tive institutions admitted students solely on the basis of SAT score 
with no racial preferences (e.g., by admitting applicants in rank order 
until all the seats are filled, or by setting a minimum SAT threshold 
above which all applicants are admitted), relatively more black admit­
tees wo�ld be found at lower SAT levels, while relatively more white 
admittees would be found at higher SAT levels. The resulting black­
white gap would simply mirror, in slightly attenuated form, the gap in 
average SAT scores between black and white applicants.85 As Bowen 
and Bok correctly observe, "[t]he only way to create a class in which 
black and white students had the same average SAT score would be to 
discriminate against black candidates."86 In short, although racial gaps 
in test scores suggest that affirmative action is probably at work, they 
do not conclusively or validly indicate the magnitude of the effect. 
The gap in average SAT scores between black and white applicants 
suggests that under a race-neutral selection process, black applicants 
would be less likely on average than white applicants to gain admis­
sion to selective institutions. In fact, the opposite is true: At the five 
institutions where Bowen and Bok examined the racial gap in SAT 
scores, approximately 25% of white applicants gained admission for 
the fall of 1989, compared to 42% of black applicants.87 With the test 
score gap as a backdrop, this difference in admission rates begins to 
82. Id. at 29; see also HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 79, at 452 (showing similar 
black-white gaps in SAT scores at twenty-three selective institutions). At four of the five 
institutions Bowen and Bok studied, they found that the average gap in SAT scores between 
black and white matriculants narrowed by sixty-eight points between 1976 and 1989. See 
BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 30. Given this trend, it is possible that the gap has narrowed 
further between 1989 and 2000. 
83. See Kane, supra note 13, at 433-35. 
84. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 20 fig.2.2. 
85. A similar gap would remain if selective institutions based admissions solely on class 
rank as determined by high school grade point averages. See Kane, supra note 13, at 435. 
86. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 16. 
87. Id. at 26. Bowen and Bok clarify that "[w]hen we speak of 'applicants' we really 
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provide a measure of the impact of racial preferences. Yet a difference 
between a 25% and a 42% likelihood of admission, though significant, 
is not so large that it obviously demonstrates the use of race as more 
than a tipping factor. Viewed one way, the data show that black appli­
cants were 68% more likely than white applicants to be admitted. 
Viewed another way, the data show that a substantial majority of both 
white and black applicants did not receive offers of admission, and 
that black applicants were only 23% less likely than white applicants 
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As Bowen and Bok point out, however, comparing average rates 
of admission for blacks and whites provides "an inaccurate picture of 
the role played by race in the admissions process."88 A different pic­
ture emerges when admission rates are disaggregated by SAT inter-
C&B database; thus, the true number of applicants is less than the number of applications. 
Id. For present purposes, this distinction is immaterial as long as it is clear that the basic unit 
of analysis is the selection decision (admission or rejection) reached for each discrete appli­
cation. 
88. Id. at 26. 
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val:89 The figure above shows that while the likelihood of admission 
generally increased with SAT score for both black and white appli­
cants,90 blacks were admitted at a higher rate than whites at every SAT 
interval. 
A closer look at this gap in admission rates yields three observa­
tions. First, the gap narrows as SAT scores become lower. At the two 
most selective institutions within Bowen and Bok's sample, the admis­
sion rates for blacks and whites with SAT scores below 1100 "were es­
sentially the same (and in some cases actually slightly higher for the 
low-scoring white applicants, a group that included some recruited 
athletes)."91 These data suggest that racial preferences have little or no 
effect at the low end of an institution's SAT distribution. Intuitively, 
this makes sense: Selective institutions admit few applicants at the low 
end of SAT scores, regardless of whether they are black or white. 
Second, the gap also narrows as SAT scores become higher. This 
gap-narrowing is primarily attributable to the sharp increase in the 
rate of white admissions toward the high end of SAT scores. For white 
applicants, the likelihood of admission rose from 30% at the 1350-1399 
SAT interval to 63% at SAT scores of 1500 or above, whereas admis­
sion rates for black applicants remained virtually the same (roughly 
70% to 75% ) at the higher end of SAT scores.92 Racial preferences 
appear to have some effect on admission rates at the high end of SAT 
scores, but the size of the effect is not overwhelming. This also makes 
sense: Selective institutions admit high proportions of applicants with 
high SAT scores, regardless of whether they are black or white. 
Third, the black-white gaps in admission rates are greatest in the 
middle to upper-middle range of SAT scores, and the magnitude of 
the gaps is striking. At the 1200-1249 SAT interval, 60% of blacks 
were admitted, compared to 19% of whites. At the 1250-1299 interval, 
74% of blacks were admitted, compared to 23% of whites. And at the 
1350-1399 interval, 80% of blacks were admitted, compared to 31 % of 
89. See id. at 27 fig.2.5. The precise values of the probabilities graphed in the figure ap­
pear in infra, Appendix, Table A, lines 6 and 8. 
90. The curve for black applicants becomes choppy at the higher end of SAT scores due 
to the very small number of black applicants at these high SAT intervals. The underlying 
data for the graph show that only 5% of black applicants had SAT scores in the 1300-1349 
interval, 3.1 % scored 1350-1399, 1.3% scored 1400-1449, 0.5% (a total of twelve black appli­
cants) scored 1450-1499, and 0.1 % (a total of two black applicants) scored over 1500. See 
infra Appendix, Table A, lines 1 and 2. With larger samples, the figure likely approximates 
an ellipse rotated at a slight angle. 
91. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 43. 
92. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 6 and 8. Again, the admission rates for black appli­
cants is choppy at the high end of SAT scores because of small numbers. The spike at the 
right end of the curve reflects the fact that nine out of twelve black applicants scoring 1450-
1499 on the SAT were admitted, while two out of two black applicants scoring 1500 or 
higher were admitted. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 2 and 7. 
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whites.93 Within this range of SAT scores, black applicants were up to 
three times more likely than whites to be admitted, even as white ap­
plicants were up to three times more likely than blacks to be rejected. 
These data suggest that racial preferences in selective admissions have 
their greatest impact on applicants in the middle to upper-middle 
range of SAT scores (1100 to 1399). Most applicants to selective 
schools - 50% of blacks and 70% of whites - fall within this range.94 
Thus, affirmative action gives minority applicants a substantial advan­
tage in the range of SAT scores where the broad majority of white ap­
plicants compete. 
Differences in admission rates by SAT interval might overstate the 
effect of racial preferences were it true that the differences reflect not 
only the role of affirmative action, but also the influence of other se­
lection criteria against which black applicants are more favorably situ­
ated than white applicants with similar SAT scores. In other words, 
controlling for additional factors might narrow the gap. There is rea­
son to believe, however, that additional controls would not narrow the 
gap by much and that Bowen and Bok's data on admission rates do 
yield valid inferences about the effect of racial preferences. 
First, it is well-established that SAT scores tend to overpredict the 
undergraduate academic performance of black students relative to 
white students. Consistent with other research,95 Bowen and Bok 
found that within their sample of twenty-eight selective institutions, 
the average class rank (based on four-year cumulative grade point av­
erages) of black matriculants in 1989 was significantly lower than the 
average rank of white matriculants within every SAT interval. Whereas 
whites with SAT scores at or above 1300 ranked on average in the 
60th percentile of their class, blacks with similar SAT scores ranked on 
average in the 36th percentile. At lower SAT intervals, the size of this 
gap remained between 22 and 25 percentile points.96 Although part of 
this gap is likely attributable to black versus white students' experi­
ences in college,97 at least some part is attributable to differences in 
93. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 6 and 8. 
94. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 1 and 3. 
95. See LEONARD RAMIST ET AL., STUDENT GROUP DIFFERENCES IN PREDICTING 
COLLEGE GRADES: SEX, LANGUAGE, AND ETHNIC GROUPS, College Board Report no. 93-
1 (1994) (summarizing research); see also PATRICIA GANDARA, PRIMING THE PUMP: 
STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITY 
UNDERGRADUATES 43-44 (1999) (citing research confirming "the overprediction problem") 
(available at <http://www.collegeboard.org>) (last visited Feb. 11, 2002); L. SCOTT MILLER, 
AN AMERICAN IMPERATIVE: ACCELERATING MINORITY EDUCATIONAL ADVANCEMENT 
(1995) (same); Vars & Bowen, supra note 75, at 465-73. 
96. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 75 fig.3.10. Even more striking is the finding that 
black students with SAT scores at or above 1300 ranked on average 4 percentile points lower 
than white students with SAT scores of less than 1000. Id. 
97. See id. at 77 (finding that even after controlling for high school grades and socioeco­
nomic status, a gap of 15 to 21 percentile points persists across all C&B schools); id. at 81-86 
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academic preparation not captured by SAT scores.98 Black applicants, 
the research shows, are somewhat less academically well-prepared 
than white applicants with the same SAT scores.99 
Second, black and white applicants with similar SAT scores might 
not be similarly situated with respect to nonacademic admissions crite­
ria. It is possible, for example, that proportionally more blacks than 
whites within a given SAT interval come from economically disadvan­
taged backgrounds.100 If an institution sought to achieve socioeco­
nomic diversity as one of its admissions goals, then this might explain 
part of the gap in admission rates between black and white applicants. 
(discussing influences in the college environment that may affect academic outcomes for 
black students); Vars & Bowen, supra note 75, at 473 (stating that substantial variance in the 
black-white GPA gap from campus to campus suggests that college experiences play a role 
in determining academic outcomes). For research suggesting that vulnerability to stereo­
types may harm the college academic performance of black students, see Claude M. Steele & 
Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test Performance of Academically Successful Af­
rican Americans, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 13, at 401-27. 
98. Bowen and Bok found that controlling for black-white differences in high school 
grades and socioeconomic status, in addition to SAT scores, gender, school selectivity, field 
of study, and athlete status, closed the black-white gap in average class rank among students 
in their entire sample of twenty-eight institutions by roughly 14 percentile points. BOWEN & 
BOK, supra note 8, at 77. A more modest effect was observed in a study of 1989 matriculants 
at eleven institutions within Bowen and Bok's sample; that study showed that controls for 
socioeconomic status, including parental occupation and education, narrowed the black­
white college performance gap by roughly 10%. Vars & Bowen, supra note 75, at 471 .  At 
one institution able to provide very detailed admissions data, more sophisticated controls 
integrating several predictors of academic performance, including SAT and achievement test 
scores, high school grades in core subjects, advanced placement data, and secondary school 
quality, narrowed the gap by about 15%. See id. at 472. 
99. Bowen and Bok suggest that the educational background of whites and blacks differ 
in an array of unmeasurable and, in some cases, intangible resources, including "educational 
aspirations," "the number of books at home," "opportunities to travel," "the nature of the 
conversation around the dinner table," " 'at-home' education . . .  in some instances because 
of the presence of a 'stay-at-home Mom,' who has deliberately sacrificed family income," 
and "less pressure to take jobs during the school year" - factors not captured by black­
white differences in socioeconomic status based on conventional measures, but likely corre­
lated with black-white differences in wealth. Id. at 80-81; see also DALTON CONLEY, BEING 
BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 55-81 
(1999) (describing the intangible educational resources that wealth (i.e., ownership of assets) 
provides, and arguing that black-white gaps in wealth, not income, largely explain black­
white gaps in educational attainment). See generally MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. 
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL 
INEQUALITY (1995). 
Importantly, however, black-white differences in academic preparation do not mean that 
affirmative action sets minority students up for failure. Bowen and Bok's research provides 
strong evidence that minority students who attend highly selective schools do not fare worse 
and in fact fare better in terms of graduation rates, advanced degrees, earnings, and satisfac­
tion with college than minority students with similar SAT scores who attend less selective 
schools. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 59-68, 114-15, 142-44, 198-201. 
100. Cf Kane, supra note 13, at 449 (among 1992 high school graduates with combined 
reading and math scores in the top tenth of the class, only 6.1 % of whites but 17.2% of 
blacks and Hispanics had income below $20,000). 
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The same might be said about preferences for athletes.101 Yet it is 
doubtful that controlling for the full range of nonacademic factors 
would significantly narrow the wide gap in admission rates at the mid­
dle to upper-middle range of SAT scores. It seems reasonable to be­
lieve that special talents, personal accomplishments, leadership abili­
ties, participation in extracurricular activities or community service, 
and other nonacademic qualities valued by admissions officers are 
evenly distributed across racial lines, or at least not significantly less 
concentrated among white applicants than among blacks.102 Indeed, 
within a given SAT interval, there is reason to suspect these qualities 
might be more concentrated within the 20% to 25% of white appli­
cants who gain admission than within the 60% to 75% of black appli­
cants who gain admission.103 
Third, even if socioeconomic status accounts for part of the high 
admission rates for blacks as compared to whites, this effect is offset 
by the substantial preference given to applicants who are children of 
alumni, a preference that works largely to the benefit of whites. In 
Bowen and Bok's study, legacy preferences had a sizable effect on 
admission rates within the SAT intervals where black-white gaps in 
admission rates were largest.104 There is also evidence that geographic 
101. The evidence suggesting that athletic preferences increase racial diversity is not 
overwhelming. Subsequent to Bowen and Bok's research, the Mellon Foundation sponsored 
a large-scale study of intercollegiate athletics. See JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. 
BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES (2001). Ex­
amining data from thirty institutions varying in size and academic selectivity, that study con­
cluded that "although athletics helps promote racial diversity, the impact is modest." Id. at 
55. Although the recruitment of male athletes for high-profile sports (basketball, football, 
and hockey) has "clearly helped to diversify campuses," id. at 54, "[t]he same statement can­
not be made . . .  for [l]ower [p]rofile sports . . .  in which the percentage of male athletes who 
were black was generally in the 3 to 4 percent range," id. at 54-55 & fig.2.8 (presenting 1989 
data). Moreover, "[o]nly in the Division IA private universities has the presence of women 
athletes increased the relative number of African American women." Id. at 136 & fig.6.6 
(reporting 1989 data). Overall, "the pressure to increase athletic opportunities for women, 
driven in large part by Title IX, cannot be said to have encouraged a greater degree of racial 
diversity." Id. at 137. 
102. Cf BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 31 ("[O]ne commonsense way of representing 
(retrospectively) a process in which the race of the applicant was truly unknown to admis­
sions officers is by assuming that black applicants, grouped by SAT ranges, would have the 
same probability of being admitted as white applicants in those same ranges."). 
103. The intuition here is that within any group of applicants with similar SAT scores 
(say 1250-1299), there is a distribution ranging from those applicants who are exceedingly 
accomplished or desirably well-rounded to those who are overly narrow, bookish, or other­
wise lackluster. Assuming that the shape of this distribution is similar for blacks and whites 
scoring 1250-1299, the relatively small fraction of white applicants offered admission (23%) 
is likely to include proportionally more candidates from the favorable end of the distribution 
than the relatively large fraction of black applicants offered admission (74%). 
104. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 29. At the 1200-1299 SAT interval, 35% of 
legacy applicants were admitted, compared to 22% of non-legacy applicants and roughly 
60% of black applicants. Id. At SAT scores at or above 1300, 60% of legacies were admitted, 
compared to 24% of non-legacies and 70% of black applicants. Id. Although Bowen and 
Bok do not tell us how many applicants had legacy status, other data suggest that the num-
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preferences disproportionately favor white applicants.105 Thus, con­
trolling for alumni and geographic preferences would widen black� 
white gaps in admission rates. 
In sum, differences in admission rates based on SAT scores pro­
vide a reasonably valid measure of the admissions advantage black 
applicants receive through affirmative action. As suggested by the 
Harvard College admissions policy featured in Bakke, racial prefer­
ences operate not at the top or bottom of the applicant pool, but in 
"the large middle group of applicants who are 'admissible' and 
deemed capable of doing good work in their courses."106 Contrary to 
what Bakke suggests, however, the race of a minority applicant in this 
middle group does not merely "tip the balance in his favor."107 It con­
fers a considerable advantage that is much more substantial than pro­
ponents of affirmative action typically acknowledge. 
Interestingly, Justice Powell's effort to downplay the role of race in 
admissions finds a parallel twenty years later in Bowen and Bok's 
work. Bowen and Bok, former university presidents who are long-time 
supporters of affirmative action and whose institutions (Princeton and 
Harvard, respectively) are featured in Bakke,108 decline to draw any 
inference about the effect of racial preferences from the substantial 
black-white gap in admission rates. Instead, they argue that: 
[t]he best way to measure the degree of preference given is by comparing 
the credentials of those black students who presumably would not have 
been enrolled under a race-neutral standard . . .  with the credentials of an 
equivalent number of rejected applicants (mostly white) who would have 
been admitted under a race-blind procedure.109 
The first group, termed "retrospectively rejected" blacks,110 consists of 
black matriculants who would have been rejected if "black applicants, 
bers are not insignificant. See, e.g. , JEAN H. FETIER, QUESTIONS AND ADMISSIONS: 
REFLECTIONS ON 100,000 ADMISSIONS DECISIONS AT STANFORD 75-76 (1995) ("[I)n a typi­
cal year, about 5 percent of the applicants [to Stanford), and about 10-12 percent of the en­
rolling freshman class, would be legacies."); id. at 76 (quoting an investigative finding by the 
Office for Civil Rights at Harvard that "(i)n 1988 . . .  280 of 1 ,602 Harvard freshmen, more 
than one in six, had fathers who had attended Harvard"). 
105. See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION 166, 235 n.75, 300 n.70 (1996). Recall that Justice Powell's paradigmatic example of 
a geographic preference favors applicants from largely white rural areas over applicants 
from more racially diverse urban areas: "A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to 
Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 316 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Harvard College admissions policy). 
106. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 316-17 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Harvard's admissions policy); id. at 
317 n.51 (quoting William Bowen's description of Princeton's admissions policy). 
109. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 18. 
1 10. Id. at 37. 
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grouped by SAT ranges, [had] the same probability of being admitted 
as white applicants in those same ranges."111 Against their qualifica­
tions, Bowen and Bok would compare "the test scores and grades of 
the bottom decile of the white students who were admitted," a group 
they take to be a fair approximation of "the other students, presuma­
bly mostly white and Asian Americans, who would have taken [the] 
places" of retrospectively rejected blacks.112 
Curiously, Bowen and Bok do not provide results of their pro­
posed comparison for the five institutions where they had the most de­
tailed admissions data. Instead, they discuss a recent study of thirty 
selective law schools showing that while "the average LSAT score of 
all white students was 24 percent higher than the average LSAT score 
of all black students[,] this difference shrinks to 10 percent when . . .  
the LSAT scores of the retrospectively rejected black students [are 
compared] with the scores of the lower-ranked white students. "113 Pre­
sumably, performing the same comparison using Bowen and Bok's 
sample would produce a similar result.114 
But the comparative method Bowen and Bok propose is flawed. 
Given the nuance with which they describe the admissions process in 
other parts of their book,115 it is surprising that, in characterizing the 
magnitude of racial preferences, they assume that the applicants who 
would replace retrospectively rejected blacks in a race-neutral admis­
sion process are those with the academic qualifications of the bottom 
decile of admitted white students. This assumption seems to imply that 
selective institutions admit applicants in rank order based on test 
scores and grades, such that opening up X number of seats through a 
race-neutral process would enable an institution to admit the next X 
applicants on the list. But selective admissions processes do not work 
that way. Just as Bowen and Bok's retrospectively rejected blacks con­
sist of black applicants up and down the SAT distribution, it is surely 
more reasonable to believe that the "retrospectively admitted" whites 
likewise would consist of applicants up and down the SAT distribu-
111. Id. at 31. 
1 12. Id. at 37. 
113. Id. at 37-38 (citing data supplied in Personal Correspondence from Linda 
Wightman, former Vice President for Testing, Operations, and Research, Law School Ad­
missions Council). 
114. At Bowen and Bok's sample of five selective institutions, the average SAT score of 
black applicants who would have been rejected under their race-neutral model was 1145. Id. 
at 42. Within the entire sample of C&B institutions, 12% of white admittees had SAT scores 
lower than 1200, and nearly half of this group had scores in the 1150-1199 interval. See infra 
Appendix, Table A, line 9. Assuming Bowen and Bok are correct that their sample of five 
institutions is "roughly representative" of the C&B pool, BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 17 
n.4, this rough comparison suggests that the test score gap between retrospectively rejected 
black applicants and the bottom decile of white admittees is indeed small. 
115. See, e.g. , BOWEN & BOK at 23-29. 
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tion, not simply those in the bottom decile. In other words, if a race­
neutral admissions policy made available X seats for an institution to 
fill, why would it fill those seats with applicants whose qualifications 
mirrored those of the bottom of the class? The more likely scenario is 
that the institution, following its usual selection process, would in­
crease white admission rates proportionally at every SAT interval. The 
average SAT score of the resulting pool of retrospectively admitted 
white students would be roughly the same as the average for all admit­
ted whites, and the difference between this number and the average 
SAT score of retrospectively rejected blacks would be quite large.1 16 
Moreover, Bowen and Bok's approach to measuring the effect of 
racial preferences, even when properly executed, is unilluminating for 
the same reason they themselves criticize black-white comparisons of 
average SAT scores.1 17 Such comparisons fail to distinguish between 
the true effect of racial preferences and the large preexisting gap be­
tween the SAT distributions of white and black applicants. The under­
representation of black applicants relative to whites at the high end of 
SAT scores, along with the overrepresentation of blacks relative to 
whites at the low end, means that differences in average SAT scores of 
black and white admittees cannot be reliably attributed to the impact 
of affirmative action. Examining admission rates for black and white 
applicants with similar SAT scores avoids the problem of the preex­
isting test score gap and thus provides a more sensible approach to 
characterizing the effect of racial preferences. 
B. The Admissions Disadvantage for White Applicants 
Whether intended or not, Bowen and Bok's effort to minimize the 
admissions advantage enjoyed by minority applicants appears to re­
flect a felt need to harmonize the actual practice of affirmative action 
with the policy design that Justice Powell thought constitutionally 
permissible. With Princeton and Harvard as his models, Justice Powell 
elaborated the plus-factor approach as an alternative to racial quotas. 
For Justice Powell, the difference in design was critical. Unlike Bakke, 
who successfully argued that the medical school's quota cost him a let­
ter of admission, a white applicant who loses a seat to a minority ap­
plicant when race is used as a tipping factor may infer "only that his 
combined qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjec-
116. Bowen and Bok do not provide the average SAT scores of white and black appli­
cants admitted to their sample of five selective institutions. But using the average SAT score 
of white applicants (1284) as the lowest possible approximation of the average SAT score of 
white admittees, see id. at 29, we find that the average test score gap between white admit­
tees and retrospectively rejected blacks (1145) is at least 139 points (1284 - 1145). The actual 
gap is likely closer to 186 points, which is the difference between the average score of white 
matriculants ( 1331) and the average score of retrospectively rejected blacks (1 145). 
117. See id. at 16-17. 
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tive factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant."1 18 That in­
ference is certainly correct. But the validity of the inference, while 
giving the plus-factor approach a greater appearance of fairness than 
racial quotas,119 ultimately has nothing to do with using race as a mere 
plus factor. It is instead dictated by the same statistical realities that 
compel the inference that Bakke's rejection was most likely attribut­
able to his combined qualifications and not the racial quota. In other 
words, what matters in determining the most reasonable causal infer­
ence is not the format of affirmative action that an institution chooses, 
but rather the basic arithmetic of selective admissions. 
Consider, for example, the basic outline of Jennifer Gratz's lawsuit 
against the University of Michigan, a leading test case likely to end up 
at the Supreme Court this year. Gratz, who applied in 1994 for admis­
sion as an undergraduate, claims that the university discriminated 
against her not by using a racial quota, but by admitting minority stu­
dents at much higher rates than it admitted white students with similar 
high school grades and SAT scores. Among applicants with grades and 
scores comparable to hers, all forty-six minorities (100%) - but only 
121 out of 378 whites (32%) - gained admission.120 Relying on this 
disparity in admission rates, Gratz contends that she would have been 
admitted were it not for racial preferences.121 
Whereas Bakke's case was built on racial differences in average 
grades and test scores, Gratz's case is built on racial differences in ad­
mission rates. But Gratz, like Bakke, is seeking to advance the causa­
tion fallacy in defiance of basic arithmetic. In the year Gratz applied, a 
total of 424 applicants (378 whites plus forty-six minorities) had grades 
and test scores comparable to hers; a total of 167 were admitted (121 
whites plus forty-six minorities). Under the university's race-conscious 
admissions policy, white applicants had a 32% chance of admission 
(121 divided by 378). Had the university admitted applicants at the 
same overall rate regardless of race, the average likelihood of admis­
sion for white and minority applicants would be 39% (167 divided by 
118. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978). 
119. See id. at 319 n.53 (opinion of Powell, J.) (favoring the plus-factor approach over 
racial quotas on the ground that " 'Ll]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice' " (quoting 
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 ,  14 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.)) (alteration in original)). 
120. Brief for Jennifer Gratz et al. at 17-18, Gratz v. Bollinger (6th Cir. May 7, 2001) 
(Nos. 01-1333, 01-1416, 01-1418), available at www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/ (last 
visited April 16, 2002). 
121. Although Gratz, having enrolled and graduated from another college, does not 
seek an order of admission to the University of Michigan, she does seek damages resulting 
from her denial of admission. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 815, 816 (E.D. 
Mich. 2000) (observing that Gratz filed, among other things, a § 1983 action for monetary 
relief); see also Complaint 'II 25, Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) 
(No. 97-75231 ), available at http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/gratz/ 
gratzham.html (last modified Feb. 4, 2002) ("As a result of defendants' racially discrimina­
tory procedures and practices, plaintiffs' applications were rejected."). 
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424). In other words, affirmative action increased the average likeli­
hood of rejection for white applicants from 61 % to 68%.  Affirmative 
action, to be sure, had some effect. But the key point is that admis­
sions decisions concerning white applicants remain, on average, far 
better explained by an applicant's combined qualifications than by the 
effect of affirmative action. 
In Gratz, as in Bakke, the smallness of the pool of minority appli­
cants and the relevance of nonobjective criteria in selecting among 
large numbers of white applicants conspire to limit the effect on white 
applicants of substantial preferences for minority applicants. Using 
data from Bowen and Bok's study, it is possible to generalize the sta­
tistical result observed in Gratz. Their data permit a rough comparison 
between the actual likelihood of admission for white applicants within 
a certain SAT interval and the hypothetical likelihood of admission 
for those white applicants under a race-neutral selection process. 
As in Gratz's case, the hypothetical race-neutral likelihood of ad­
mission for all applicants within a given SAT interval may be esti­
mated by dividing the total number of applicants actually admitted by 
the total number of applicants. This assumes that admissions officers 
would admit applicants with similar SAT scores (black or white) at the 
same rate, and that the number of applicants actually admitted within 
a given SAT interval equals the number that would have been admit­
ted under a race-neutral process. Within the 1200-1249 SAT interval, 
for example, Bowen and Bok's five selective institutions admitted 543 
out of 2816 white applicants and 147 out of 245 black applicants in 
1989 - a total of 690 out of 3061 applicants.122 Thus, the hypothetical 
likelihood of admission for an average applicant (white or black) 
scoring 1200-1249 on the SAT would have been 22.5% (690 divided by 
3,061) - only slightly higher than the actual 19.3% rate of admission 
for whites in this SAT interval.123 The fact that the actual rate of ad­
mission for black applicants within this SAT interval was 60% (indeed, 
considerably higher than the actual rate for whites) is relevant to un­
derstanding the benefit of being black, but irrelevant to understanding 
the burden that racial preferences imposed on white applicants. 
122. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 2, 4, S, 7, 9 and 10. 
123. See infra Appendix, Table A, lines 8 and 11 .  
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TABLE l 
ACTUAL RATES VERSUS RACE-NEUTRAL RATE 
OF ADMISSION FOR BLACK AND WHITE APPLICANTS124 
Actual rate of Actual rate of Race-neutral rate 
SAT admission for admission for of admission for 
interval black aeelicants white aeelicants all aeelicants 
1500+ 100.0% 63.0% 63.2% 
1450-1499 75.0% 51.1% 51.1 % 
1400-1449 69.6% 39.9% 40.3% 
1350-1399 80.0% 30.7% 31.7% 
1300-1349 64.6% 25.0% 26.2% 
1250-1299 73.9% 22.6% 25.7% 
1200-1249 60.0% 19.3% 22.5% 
1 150-1199 55.5 % 18.7% 22.9% 
1 100-1149 46.2% 13.3% 18.2% 
1050-1099 40.6% 12.4% 18.6% 
1000-1049 35.4% 9.6% 16.8% 
<1000 17.0% 3.3% 8.6% 
As Table 1 shows, eliminating racial preferences leaves the rate of 
admission for white applicants virtually unchanged at the high end of 
SAT scores (1300 and above), where the number of black applicants is 
especially small. Although the difference between the actual and hy­
pothetical race-neutral admission rates for white applicants increases 
from roughly 3 to 5 percentage points as SAT scores decrease from 
1300 to 1100, the advantage of race neutrality for white applicants re­
mains small at precisely the SAT intervals where the advantage of race 
consciousness for black applicants is largest. The advantage of race 
neutrality appears to accrue primarily to white applicants at the low 
end of the SAT range (below 1100). There the difference between ac­
tual and hypothetical admission rates for whites approaches 7 percent­
age points, largely because the number of black applicants who would 
be denied admission under a race-neutral process is substantial rela­
tive to the total number of white applicants. However, since selective 
institutions admit so few applicants (black or white) in this low range, 
the advantage of race neutrality is more illusory than real. At SAT 
scores below 1000, for example, a white applicant who faced a 96.7% 
124. For methodology and calculations, see infra Appendix, Table A. 
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likelihood of rejection can hardly argue that race-consciousness cost 
her a letter of admission when she would have faced a 91.4% likeli­
hood of rejection under a race-neutral process. For applicants facing 
such long odds, the marginal effect of affirmative action is just that -
marginal. 
Moreover, there is reason to believe that the effect of affirmative 
action is even more marginal than the hypothetical race-neutral ad­
mission rates in Table 1 suggest. Those rates were calculated on the 
assumption that the total number of applicants actually admitted 
within a given SAT interval fairly approximates the total number that 
would have been admitted under a race-neutral process. But that as­
sumption almost certainly overestimates the number of admittees in 
the absence of racial preferences. The reason has to do with black­
white differences in "yield," the rate at which applicants offered ad­
mission actually accept the offer. As Bowen and Bok explain, when 
admissions processes use racial preferences, the yield "tends to be 
lower for highly qualified black candidates than for comparable white 
candidates because the black candidates are likely to be admitted by 
more schools."125 At the five institutions for which Bowen and Bok 
had the most detailed data, the average black-white difference in yield 
was 14 percentage points in 1989.126 White applicants scoring 1100 to 
1349 on the SAT accepted offers of admission more than 50% of the 
time, whereas comparable black applicants accepted offers only 30% 
to 40% of the time.127 
In the absence of racial preferences, however, the rate at which 
black applicants accept offers of admission "would almost surely rise" 
and "would move up toward the white yield."128 In other words, " [i]f 
all institutions of higher education were required to adopt race-neutral 
admissions policies . . .  the typical black candidate who was still ac­
cepted by any given school would presumably have fewer options. "129 
One would expect to see black applicants accept offers at the same 
rate as white applicants if both are admitted at the same rate and face 
the same array of options. The elimination of affirmative action thus 
means that selective institutions would not need to make as many of­
fers of admission as they otherwise would in order to fill the same 
number of seats. By decreasing the total number of offers required to 
produce the same number of matriculants, the projected increase in 
125. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 33-34. For the same reason, the yield for black or 
white applicants tends to decrease as SAT scores increase, indicating that applicants with 
higher SAT scores are likely to have more choices than applicants with lower SAT scores. 
See id. at 34 & fig.2.9. 
126. See id. at 34 n.18. 
127. Id. at 34 fig.2.9. 
128. Id. at 35. 
129. Id. 
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black yield tends to lower the hypothetical race-neutral rate of admis­
sion.130 
Using Bowen and Bok's data on yield, it is possible to adjust the 
hypothetical race-neutral admission rates in Table 1 to account for this 
additional factor. As we observed earlier, for example, in 1989 the five 
schools in Bowen and Bok's sample admitted 543 out of 2816 white 
applicants and 147 out of 245 black applicants scoring 1200 to 1249 on 
the SAT, a total of 690 out of 3061 applicants.131 Within that SAT in­
terval, 53.4% of whites and 31.9% of blacks accepted offers of admis­
sion, 132 which means that roughly 290 whites and forty-seven blacks, or 
. a total of 337 students, accepted offers.133 In the absence of racial pref­
erences, how many applicants would the five schools need to admit in 
order to gain 337 acceptances? If the yield for white applicants, 53.4%, 
provides a good estimate of the yield for all applicants (black or white) 
under a race-neutral process, then a total of 631 applicants would need 
to be admitted,134 slightly less than the 690 applicants actually admitted 
under race-conscious policies. The resulting race-neutral admission 
rate, now adjusted for yield, is 20.6%,135 even lower than the unad­
justed race-neutral rate of 22.5% and only marginally higher than the 
19.3% admission rate that white applicants actually faced. As Table 2 
. shows, adjusting for yield produces similar results within every SAT 
interval, confirming that the impact of racial preferences on the odds 
of admission facing white applicants is remarkably slight. 
130. Of course, this observation assumes that the elimination of affirmative action 
would not cause selective institutions to expand the number of seats in their entering classes. 
I see no reason why such expansion would occur. 
131. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10. 
132. Infra Appendix, Table B, lines 1 and 4. 
133. 53.4% x 543 whites = 290 whites. 31.9% x 147 blacks = 47 blacks. 290 whites + 47 
blacks = 337 students total. See infra Appendix, Table B, Jines 3, 6, and 7. 
134. 631 x 53.4% = 337. See infra Appendix, Table B, line 8. 
135. 631 + 3061 = .206. See infra Appendix, Table B, line 10. 
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TABLE 2 
ACTUAL RATE VERSUS YIELD-ADJUSTED RACE-NEUTRAL 
RATE OF ADMISSION FOR WHITE APPLICANTS136 
Actual rate of Yield-adjusted Unadjusted 
SAT admission for race-neutral race-neutral 
interval white applicants admission rate admission rate 
1500+ 63.0% 62.7% 63.2% 
1450-1499 51.1% 50.8% 51.1% 
1400-1449 39.9% 39.8% 40.3% 
1350-1399 30.7% 30.8% 31.7% 
1300-1349 25.0% 25.4% 26.2% 
1250-1299 22.6% 23.8% 25.7% 
1200-1249 19.3% 20.6% 22.5% 
1150-1199 18.7% 20.9% 22.9% 
1100-1149 13.3% 16.2% 18.2% 
1050-1099 12.4% 15.5% 18.6% 
1000-1049 9.6% 1 1.7% 16.8% 
<1000 3.3% 6.7% 8.6% 
To summarize, there is no doubt that receiving a rejection letter 
from a selective institution is a considerable disappointment. But the 
reflexive tendency to blame affirmative action runs counter to basic 
reasoning and empirical evidence. In any highly selective competition 
where white applicants greatly outnumber minority applicants, and 
where multiple objective and nonobjective criteria are relevant, the 
average white applicant will not fare significantly worse under a selec­
tion process that is race-conscious than under a process that is race­
neutral. The articulation of this arithmetic truth provides a necessary 
antidote to the rhetorical excesses of affirmative action's critics. 
Ill. NOT ALL WHITE APPLICANTS ARE CREATED EQUAL 
In addition to loosening the grip that the Bakke narrative has had 
on the affirmative action debate, dispelling the causation fallacy gives 
rise to a variety of legal implications for white plaintiffs challenging 
affirmative action. Those implications, the subject of this Part, are not 
136. For methodology and calculations, see infra Appendix, Table B. 
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immediately apparent from studying the marginal effect of racial pref­
erences on white admissions probabilities. So far I have focused on 
admissions probabilities in order to highlight the improbability of the 
causal inference at the core of the Bakke narrative. But admissions 
probabilities, while useful for describing how affirmative action affects 
white applicants on average, do not capture the mechanics and impact 
of affirmative action at the level of individual applicants. The odds 
facing the hypothetical "average white applicant" present only a com­
posite report of the discrete experiences of many individual applicants. 
What matters in a lawsuit, of course, is not the treatment of the aver­
age white applicant, but rather the treatment of the individual appli­
cant who has chosen to become a plaintiff.137 
Thus, this Part examines what is happening to individual white ap­
plicants in the admissions process underneath the probabilities. The 
conventional Bakke narrative, we have already discovered, does not 
provide a complete account of how affirmative action affects white 
applicants. This Part elucidates two additional narratives that are quite 
different and, as a statistical matter, more significant. These alterna­
tives to the Bakke narrative suggest important differences in the way 
affirmative action impacts white applicants - differences obscured by 
the causation fallacy yet essential to adjudicating their legal claims. 
A. Two Kinds of Injury 
In exploring the legal implications of the causation fallacy, it is im­
portant to clarify at the outset what the illogic of the fallacy does not 
imply: It does not imply that intentional discrimination poses no ac­
tionable problem so long as it inflicts little or no consequential harm. 
Although the basic arithmetic of selective admissions dictates that the 
vast majority of white applicants who are rejected under a race­
conscious admissions process would likewise be rejected under a race­
neutral process, those applicants nevertheless have a legitimate 
ground for complaint under well-established equal protection norms. 
As the district court in Hopwood observed, "there are two types of 
injury in a case involving the . . .  use of racial preferences":138 a "tangi­
ble type of injury . . .  [that] occurs when a plaintiff is actually denied 
some right or benefit, such as admission to [a] school," and "an intan­
gible injury" that occurs when "the government's discriminatory clas­
sification . . .  prevents a plaintiff from 'competing on an equal footing' 
with other applicants."139 In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme 
137. The right to equal opportunity is a "personal right." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); see also id. ("[T)he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution protect persons, not groups."). 
138. Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 883 (W.D. Tex. 1998). 
139. Id. (citation omitted). 
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Court has made clear that "the inability to compete on an equal foot­
ing" is a sufficient injury for constitutional standing to challenge af­
firmative action, even without any allegation that the plaintiff "would 
have obtained the benefit but for the "[discriminatory] barrier."140 
Justice Powell made this point in Bakke when he noted that "even if 
Bakke had been unable to prove that he would have been admitted in 
the absence of the special program, it would not follow that he lacked 
standing."141 "[A]part from the failure to be admitted," Bakke suffered 
a cognizable injury from "the University's decision not to permit [him] 
to compete for all 100 places in the class."142 
The causation fallacy thus does not speak directly to the unfairness 
of being denied the opportunity to compete on an equal footing. In­
deed, both Bakke and Bowen and Bok's study indicate that white ap­
plicants, even those who would not have been admitted under a race­
neutral process, would have faced substantially better odds of admis­
sion had they not been white. This fact is quite instructive, for it sug­
gests an ambiguity in what it means to say that the rejection of a white 
applicant was "caused" by affirmative action. The causal claim could 
mean, as it does in the Bakke narrative, that the white applicant would 
have been admitted had the admissions process employed no racial 
preferences. Alternatively, it could mean, as it does in an equal­
footing complaint, that the applicant would have been admitted had 
he been given the same preference as minority applicants. To consider 
what would have happened to a white applicant had he been black is 
not equivalent to considering what would have happened to that ap­
plicant had the admissions process been race-neutral. 
As I explain below, this distinction turns out to be important for 
differentiating among white applicants and their legal claims. The two 
kinds of injury attributable to affirmative action enable us to distin­
guish three kinds of rejected white applicants: One genuinely fits the 
Bakke narrative but rarely appears in court; one has standing to pur­
sue an equal-footing claim, with some limitations; and one lacks 
standing to challenge affirmative action altogether. 
140. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993); see also Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (per curiam) ("The 
relevant injury in such cases is 'the inability to compete on an equal footing.' " (quoting 
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 666)); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211 ("The injury in cases of this kind is 
that a 'discriminatory classification prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal 
footing.' The aggrieved party 'need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but 
for the barrier in order to establish standing.' " (alteration in original) (internal citations 
omitted)). 
141. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-81 n.14 (1978) (opinion of 
Powell, J.). 
142. Id. at 281 n.14. 
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The clearest way to develop this typology is to examine the me­
chanics of the admissions process and the outcomes for individual ap­
plicants in specific cases. Three helpful examples happen to occur to­
gether in a recent lawsuit
. 
brought by a trio of white plaintiffs -
Ashley Davis, Craig Green, and Kirby Tracy - challenging the 
University of Georgia's undergraduate admissions policies.143 Al­
though the latest version of the university's affirmative action policy 
was recently struck down by the Eleventh Circuit in a different law­
suit, 144 the case filed by Davis, Green, and Tracy nonetheless provides 
an opportune window for observing the effects of affirmative action 
within the large and diverse sea of white applicants. 
The university, Georgia's flagship institution, maintains a competi­
tive admissions process in which applicants far exceed the number of 
available seats.145 In 1995, when Tracy applied, ,  the university had an 
official policy of admitting students on the basis of minimum SAT 
scores, high school grade point averages ("GP As"), and academic in­
dex scores (a weighted composite of SAT scores and GPAs). Black 
applicants were admitted if they had at least an 800 SAT score, a 2.0 
GP A, and a 2.0 academic index; white applicants had to have at least a 
980 SAT score, a 2.5 GPA, and a 2.4 academic index.146 Tracy had a 
GPA of 3.47 and an SAT score of 830. Because he did not meet the 
minimum requirements for white applicants, the university rejected his 
application. It was undisputed that Tracy would have been admitted 
had he been black.147 Based on uncontested evidence introduced by 
the university, however, the district court determined .that Tracy still 
would not have been admitted under a race-neutral process.148 
143. The chronology of that litigation is as follows: Wooden v. Board of Regents of 
University System of Georgia, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Ga. 1999) (ruling on Kirby Tracy 
and Ashley Davis); Tracy v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 59 F. Supp. 
2d 1314 (S.D. Ga. 1999) (ruling on Craig Green); Tracy v. Board of Regents of University 
System of Georgia, 208 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (vacating and remanding to the district 
court for reconsideration in light of Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18 (1999)); Tracy v. Board of 
Regents of University System of Georgia, No. CV 497-45, 2000 WL 1123268 (S.D. Ga. June 
16, 2000) (reinstating prior opinions); Wooden v. Board of Regents of University System of 
Georgia, 247 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (dismissing in part, affirming in part, reversing and 
vacating in part, and remanding to the district court). "Wooden" is the name of one of three 
additional plaintiffs who argued that Georgia's continued operation of historically black in­
stitutions unlawfully discriminates against nonblacks. After the district court dismissed the 
Wooden plaintiffs for lack of standing, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed them for failure to file 
a timely notice of appeal. See Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1264. 
144. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). 
145. See Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1265. 
146. See Wooden, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1374 (describing 1995 standard for "automatic ad­
mission"). 
147. See id.; Wooden, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1374. 
148. Tracy, 2000 WL 1123268, at *7, *11  (citing the record). 
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The university revised its admissions policy in 1995 out of concern 
about the constitutionality of its two-track system. The revised policy, 
which took effect in 1996, divided the admissions process into three 
stages. In the first stage, the university selected the majority of its 
freshman class purely on the basis of objective criteria; applicants with 
minimum academic index and SAT scores were automatically admit­
ted.149 In 1996, applicants with an academic index of at least 2.6 were 
a�tomatically admitted; in 1997, the cut-off was 2.5.150 Among appli­
cants not automatically admitted, the university then selected a subset 
for further evaluation. In 1996, applicants with an academic index be­
tween 2.3 and 2.6 moved to the second stage of the admissions process; 
in 1997, applicants with an academic index between 2.25 and 2.5 
moved forward.151 All others were automatically rejected. In the sec­
ond stage, the university calculated what it called a "total student in­
dex" ("TSI") based on a combination of academic and demographic 
factors, including in-state residence, alumni relationships, and (until 
last year) race.152 Applicants above a certain TSI threshold were ad­
mitted, while applicants below a certain threshold were rejected. Ap­
plicants in the middle went on to a third stage, called the "edge read," 
in which two readers re-evaluated each applicant on the basis of race­
neutral criteria and assigned a score from -2.0 to +2.0.153 Applicants 
above a certain score were admitted; the rest were rejected. An appli­
cant's TSI score had no weight in the edge read.154 
Ashley Davis, who applied in 1996, had an SAT score of 980, a 
GP A of 2.94, and an academic index score of 2.21. Because her aca­
demic index was below the 2.3 cut-off for advancing to the second 
stage of the admissions process, the university turned down her appli­
cation.155 Craig Green, who applied in 1997, had an SAT equivalency 
score of 1170 to 1190, a GPA of 3.3, and an academic index score of 
149. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1266; see also Wooden, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 1374. In 1996, the 
university selected 75% of its class in the first stage. Id. In 1997, it selected 88% of its class in 
the first stage. Tracy, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1316. 
150. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1266. Neither the court of appeals nor the district court indi­
cated the minimum SAT score required for automatic admission. 
151. Id. Those applicants also had to meet a minimum SAT score, which the court of 
appeals and district court again do not indicate. 
152. Id. at 1266 & n.4. In the summer of 2000, following an adverse district court deci­
sion in the Johnson litigation, the university decided to stop considering race as a factor in 
undergraduate admissions until the Johnson litigation is resolved. See Johnson v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2001). 
153. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1266-67; see also Tracy, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1317. "Despite ex­
tensive discovery, Green has not been able to show that UGA racially classified applicants at 
the [edge read) stage." Tracy, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1318; id. at 1318 n.2 ("While Green has 
shown that the edge readers engage in a subjective process, the record evidence permits no 
reasonable inference that race plays a factor at this stage."). 
154. See id. at 1317 ("[A)t the [edge read) stage, all applicants started at zero."). 
155. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1266. 
March 2002] The Causation Fallacy 1083 
2.39.156 Although his scores were too low for automatic admission at 
the first stage, they were high enough to move his application to the 
second stage. At that stage, Green received a TSI score of 3.89, which 
included points for his Georgia residency, his parents' educational 
level, and his academic qualifications. He did not receive the 0.5-point 
credit given to nonwhite applicants that year. In 1997, the threshold 
for admission at the second stage was a TSI score of 4.40, and the 
threshold for rejection was 3.79. Because Green's TSI score fell in the 
middle, his application went to the third stage. Both edge readers wlio 
reviewed Green's application gave him the lowest score of -2.0. Be­
cause the cut-off for third-stage admission in 1997 was an edge read 
score of -0.5, Green was rejected.157 
Tracy, Davis, and Green sued the university, challenging its race­
conscious admissions process on various constitutional and statutory 
grounds. A close look at each plaintiff makes clear that not all of them 
were in a position to challenge the university's use of racial prefer­
ences. Moreover, the differences among them suggest a three­
dimensional typology of unsuccessful white applicants. 
Category 1: Ashley Davis and Craig Green 
Let us look first at Ashley Davis. Davis was rejected under an ad­
missions policy that took race into account only in the second stage of 
the selection process, but not in the first or third. Davis never reached 
the second stage; her application was turned down at the first stage 
because her academic index score did not meet the race-neutral 
threshold for avoiding automatic rejection. Racial preferences thus 
played no role in the university's decision. Indeed, not only would 
Davis have been rejected had there been no affirmative action at the 
second stage, she also would have been rejected had she been non­
white. For this reason, the district court and Eleventh Circuit correctly 
concluded that Davis lacked standing to assert that the university de­
nied her an opportunity to compete on an equal footing with all other 
applicants.158 
What Davis's example suggests is that, for many white applicants, 
failure to gain admission has nothing to do with race.159 Bowen and 
156. Tracy, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1317. Green scored 27 on a different college entrance 
exam, the ACT, which translated into an SAT score of 1 170 to 1190. See id. 
157. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1267. 
158. See id. at 1281-82 ("Simply put, at the only stage during which Davis's application 
was considered by UGA, she was plainly on an equal footing with all other applicants, and 
was deemed unqualified according to entirely race-neutral criteria."); Tracy v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV 497-45, 2000 WL 1123268, at *10 (S.D. Ga. June 16, 
2000); Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 32 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1375-76 (S.D. Ga. 
1999). 
159. See Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 883 (W.D. Tex. 1998) on remand (Sparks, 
J.) ("There is no basis in fact or logic to suggest . . .  that all [white] applicants who were de-
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Bok's statistical portrait of selective admissions confirms this point. 
The disparities in admission rates in their study show that the average 
white applicant is treated less favorably than the average black appli­
cant, especially in the middle range of SAT scores. But again, what 
matters in a lawsuit is not how racial preferences affect the average 
white applicant, but rather how they affected the individual plaintiff.160 
In the 1200-1249 SAT interval, for example, although white applicants 
as a group would have had a 60% (instead of 19%) chance of admis­
sion had they been black,161 the fact is that among white applicants 
facing a 60% success rate, 40% would still fail to gain admission. Like 
Ashley Davis, the white applicants in that 40% cannot claim they 
would have been admitted absent affirmative action, nor can they 
claim they were denied an opportunity to compete on equal footing 
with black applicants. 
The percentage of white applicants like Ashley Davis varies from 
one SAT interval to another: 44% in the 1 150-1199 range, 26% in the 
1250-1299 range, 20% in the 1350-1399 range.162 But taking into ac­
count the number of white applicants within each SAT interval, 
Bowen and Bok's data show that even if white applicants within each 
SAT interval were admitted at the rate for black applicants (ignoring 
practical limits on the total number of seats available), 36% of all 
white applicants - or nearly half of all rejected white applicants -
still would not have gained admission.163 This finding seems at once 
remarkable and unremarkable. It is remarkable because the conven­
tional Bakke narrative contains not the slightest hint that affirmative 
nied admission . . .  were denied admission substantially - or, for that matter, even in small 
part - because of race."); id. at 884 ("[A)n applicant who has no conceivable chance of ad­
mission cannot possibly show that race was a substantial or motivating factor in the . . .  
school's decision to deny him or her admission."). 
160. See supra note 137; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) ("(I)t is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection 
against classifications based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions 
impinge upon personal rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a 
particular group . . . .  " (emphasis added)). 
161. Infra Appendix, Table A, lines 6 and 8. 
162. Had they been black, white applicants in the 1 150-1199, 1250-1299 and 1350-1399 
intervals would have faced admission rates of 56%, 74% and 80%, respectively, which means 
26%, 20%, and 44% of those applicants would have been rejected regardless of race. Infra 
Appendix, Table A, line 6. 
163. Bowen and Bok's study included 24,700 white applicants. From lines 4 and 6 of Ta­
ble A in the Appendix, it is possible to calculate the number of white applicants that would 
have been admitted had they been black: (.170)(1062) + (.354)(593) + (.406)(939) + 
(.462)(1507) + (.555)(2,075) + (.600)(2816) + (.739)(3384) + (.646)(3878) + (.800)(3532) + 
(.696)(2766) + (.750)(1507) + (1 .00)(642) = 15,839. If 15,839 white applicants would have 
been admitted under the admission rates for black applicants, then 8861 - or 35.9% -
would have been rejected. Summing the figures in line 9 of Table A, we find that 6433 white 
applicants were actually admitted, which means 18,267 were actually rejected. The percent­
age who still would have been rejected under the black admission rates is 8861 divided by 
18,267, or 48.5%. 
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action is wholly irrelevant to the fate of a substantial number of white 
applicants. It is unremarkable because it is obvious, on a moment's re­
flection, that the highly competitive nature of selective admissions 
means that many applicants, including many white applicants, will be 
rejected for reasons having nothing to do with race. White applicants 
like Ashley Davis, whose academic qualifications simply are not com­
petitive regardless of race, have no standing to challenge affirmative 
action even on an equal-footing theory. 
In contrast to Davis, Craig Green had an academic index score that 
was high enough to keep him from being rejected at the first stage of 
the university's admissions process, but not high enough for automatic 
admission. In the second stage, his application undeniably received 
less favorable treatment on the basis of his race. Had he not been 
white, his TSI score would have been 4.39 instead of 3.89, reflecting 
the 0.5-point credit for being nonwhite. Even a TSI score of 4.39, how­
ever, would not have satisfied the 4.40 threshold for second-stage ad­
mission. Green's application would have proceeded to the third stage 
of review regardless of his race, and in that stage, both edge readers 
gave him the lowest possible score on the basis of race-neutral criteria. 
In short, Green's application would have met the same outcome had 
he been white or nonwhite. Moreover, given his low score in the edge 
read, it is highly improbable that he would have gained one of the 
seats that would have been available absent the use of race in the sec­
ond stage. 
Does Green, whose application was subject to race-conscious re­
view, stand in a better position to challenge the admissions policy than 
Davis? The district court thought not, concluding that "Green simply 
cannot show he was otherwise qualified to compete for admission 
equally with minority applicants."164 "Every non-white applicant ad­
mitted at the TSI phase possessed a TSI score higher than Green's 
even before the addition of any ethnic/racial bonus points," the court 
observed,165 and in the edge read, the university's "final decision to 
reject his application was not based on race. "166 But the Eleventh 
Circuit reversed on the ground that Green, unlike Davis, "has actually 
been exposed to unequal treatment."167 According to the court of ap­
peals, "the direct exposure to unequal treatment" is a cognizable 
injury-in-fact for purposes of standing.168 
164. Tracy v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV 497-45, 2000 WL 1123268, at 
*11 (S.D. Ga. June 16, 2000). 
165. Tracy v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1320 (S.D. Ga. 
1999). 
166. Id. at 1318. 
167. Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1279 (11th Cir. 
2001). 
168. Id. at 1280. 
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Green's case is not as clear-cut as Davis's, as the disagreement be­
tween the district court and the court of appeals suggests. Because his 
application reached the race-conscious TSI stage, it is not literally true 
that race played no role in his case. But to deny Davis standing while 
granting it to Green, as the Eleventh Circuit did, appears to elevate 
form over substance. For Green's case can be made identical to 
Davis's simply by bifurcating the TSI stage into two substages, the first 
race-neutral and the second race-conscious. In the race-neutral sub­
stage, the university would assign each applicant a TSI score account­
ing only for nonracial factors. It would then admit all applicants with a 
TSI score of at least 4.40, while sending all applicants with a TSI score 
from 3.79 to 3.89 to the edge read, whether white or nonwhite. In the 
race-conscious sub-stage, the university would adjust the remaining 
applicants' TSI scores to account for race. It would then admit appli­
cants at 4.40 and above, reject applicants below 3.79, and send the rest 
to the edge read. Under this functionally equivalent process, Green's 
application would have passed directly from the first sub-stage to the 
edge read - where it would have been rejected - without ever hav­
ing been exposed to unequal treatment based on race. In the context 
of Bowen and Bok's study, Green would join Davis among the ranks 
of white applicants who would not have been admitted even if their 
odds had been as favorable as the odds facing black applicants. 
Green's example thus suggests an important distinction between 
"the inability to compete on an equal footing," which has been recog­
nized by the Supreme Court as a cognizable injury in fact, and mere 
"exposure to unequal treatment," which has not. An equal-footing 
claim presumes that the white applicant is actually "able and ready" to 
compete on an equal footing with minority applicants, were it not for 
the university's consideration of race.169 To qualify as "able and 
ready," a white applicant need not show that he would have been ad­
mitted under a race-neutral selection process. But at a minimum, he 
must show that he would have gained admission had he competed on 
an equal footing with minority applicants under the race-conscious 
process being challenged. A white applicant who cannot make that 
showing - who would have been rejected even if accorded the same 
preference given to minority applicants - cannot plausibly assert that, 
were it not for his race, he would have been "able and ready" to com­
pete equally with minority applicants. That applicant should lack 
standing. 
To be sure, the bare fact of exposure to unequal treatment on the 
basis of race is not inherently unactionable. Exposure alone is some-
169. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656, 666 (1993). 
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times capable of inflicting expressive or stigmatic harm.170 But Green, 
predictably, has not alleged any non-instrumental harm. He does not 
contend that his exposure to unequal treatment at the TSI stage stig­
matized him based on his race. Nor does he suggest that the admis­
sions policy expressed contempt or racial prejudice toward him, or 
that it otherwise conveyed a message of racial inferiority or subordina­
tion.171 I shall have more to say later about non-instrumental harm,172 
but for now it is enough to observe that it is far from clear how the 
university's consideration of race injured Green in a "concrete and 
particularized" way, any more than it injured Ashley Davis.173 Green, 
like Davis, sued the university because he believed he was unfairly de­
nied admission on the basis of his race. Yet his claim lacks any viable 
factual predicate. The Eleventh Circuit's view that Green's exposure 
to unequal treatment, without more, somehow tainted the university's 
decision to reject his application conceives of an injury to Green that 
is prohibitively abstract.174 If this is correct, then the class of white ap­
plicants without standing to challenge affirmative action includes not 
only applicants like Davis for whom race played literally no role in the 
process of selection, but also applicants like Green for whom race 
played no role in the result. 
Category 2: Kirby Tracy 
Of course, each year many unsuccessful white applicants, unlike 
Green, would have been admitted had they been nonwhite. The third 
Georgia plaintiff, Kirby Tracy, is such an applicant. The record in 
Tracy's case is clear on two points. In the year he applied, he would 
have been admitted had he been black.175 Nevertheless, he would not 
170. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (stating that an official policy 
of "separate but equal" inflicts on members of a disfavored race "a feeling of inferiority as to 
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to 
be undone"). 
171. It seems implausible, in my view, to argue that programs designed to benefit mem­
bers of historically disadvantaged groups actually express negative judgments about the 
moral worth and capacities of members of historically advantaged groups. With respect to 
intangible injury, Green is simply not in the same position as a black student exposed to 
unequal treatment against the historical backdrop of Jim Crow. But cf. Adarand Construc­
tors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) ("In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign 
prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice."). 
172. See infra notes 213-228 and accompanying text. 
173. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that plaintiff must 
have suffered a "concrete and particularized" injury in order to have constitutional stand­
ing). 
174. See id. ; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) ("Abstract injury is 
not enough [for constitutional standing]."). 
175. See Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 
2001). 
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have been admitted even if the university had not used racial prefer­
ences in its admissions process.176 Under settled law, Tracy has stand­
ing to oppose the 1995 admissions policy on an equal-footing theory, 
regardless of whether he would have won admission under a race­
neutral selection process.177 Applicants like Tracy are thus positioned 
to challenge the merits of affirmative action without relying on the il­
logic of the causation fallacy. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court ex­
plained in its most recent encounter with affirmative action in univer­
sity admissions, Texas v. Lesage,178 the issue of causation remains 
important as a potential limitation on the range of legal claims avail­
able even to such applicants. 
Lesage involved the use of racial preferences by a University of 
Texas doctoral program. Fran�ois Lesage, a white African immigrant, 
was one of 223 applicants to the Ph.D. program in 1996. The school 
rejected Lesage but offered admission to "roughly 20 candidates," in­
cluding "at least one minority candidate."179 Lesage asserted various 
claims against the school, including a § 1983 claim for damages arising 
from the school's rejection of his application. In district court, the 
school won summary judgment by establishing beyond dispute that 
Lesage would not have been admitted even if the admissions process 
had been race-neutral. 180 The Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground that 
the summary judgment inquiry should have focused on " 'whether the 
state violated Lesage's constitutional rights by rejecting his application 
in the course of operating a racially discriminatory admissions pro­
gram.' "181 According to the Fifth Circuit, an applicant rejected under 
a race-conscious review process has " 'suffered an implied injury' -
the inability to compete on an equal footing."182 
The Supreme Court in turn reversed, explaining that "[u]nder Mt. 
Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, even if the [school] has considered 
an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plain­
tiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would 
have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration."183 
176. See Tracy v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV 497-45, 2000 WL 1 123268, 
at *7, *11  (S.D. Ga. June 16, 2000). 
177. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211  (1995); Northeastern Fla. 
Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993). 
178. 528 U.S. 18 (1999) (per curiam). 
179. Id. at 19. 
180. See id. at 19-20. It was undisputed that "[a]t least 80 applicants had higher under­
graduate grade point averages (GPA's) than Lesage, 152 applicants had higher Graduate 
Record Examination (GRE) scores, and 73 applicants had both higher GPA's and higher 
GRE scores." Id. at 19. Moreover, neither Lesage's personal statement nor his letters of rec­
ommendation strengthened his application. See id. 
181 .  Id. at W (quoting Lesage v. Texas, 158 F.3d 213, 222 (5th Cir. 1998)). 
182. Id. (quoting Lesage, 158 F.3d at 222). 
183. Id. at 20-21 (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)). 
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In Mt. Healthy, a teacher named Fred Doyle alleged that the school 
had unlawfully terminated him in retaliation for disclosing an internal 
memorandum to a local radio station.184 In refusing to renew Doyle's 
contract, the school cited unprofessional conduct that included not 
only his disclosure of the memo, but also an incident in which he made 
obscene gestures to students in the school cafeteria.185 While agreeing 
with Doyle that the radio station incident involved constitutionally 
protected speech,186 the Court held that the school's action, even if 
substantially motivated by Doyle's protected conduct, "would [not] 
necessarily amount to a constitutional violation justifying remedial ac­
tion. "187 The Court observed that it is "necessary to formulate a test of 
causation which distinguishes between a result caused by a constitu­
tional violation and one not so caused" for purposes of determining 
liability in certain areas of constitutional law.188 Although the school 
"considered constitutionally protected conduct in deciding not to rehire 
Doyle," it was not "precluded . . .  from attempting,to prove to a trier of 
fact that quite apart from such conduct Doyle's record was such that he 
would not have been rehired in any event."189 "A borderline or mar­
ginal candidate," the Court said, "ought not to be able, by engaging in 
[protected] conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his per­
formance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of 
that record."190 
Lesage extended Mt. Healthy's "test of causation" to the equal pro­
tection context.191 The Court unanimously held that "where a plaintiff 
challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an im­
permissible criterion and it is undisputed that the government would 
have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury 
warranting relief under § 1983."192 While stating that a causation de­
fense has no applicability where "a plaintiff . . .  challenges an ongoing 
184. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 282-84. 
185. Id. at 282-83 & n.1. Doyle's record also included an argument with another teacher 
resulting in a suspension that was later rescinded, an argument with school cafeteria employ­
ees over the amount of spaghetti he had been served, and an incident in which he referred to 
students, in connection with a disciplinary complaint, as "sons of bitches." Id. at 281-82. 
186. Id. at 284. 
187. Id. at 285. 
188. Id. at 286. The Court observed that the "test of causation" had been applied in 
cases involving due process challenges to allegedly involuntary confessions. Id. 
189. Id. at 286. 
190. Id. 
191. Recognizing that "previous decisions on this point have typically involved alleged 
retaliation for protected First Amendment activity rather than racial discrimination," the 
Court said "that distinction is immaterial. The underlying principle is the same: The gov­
ernment can avoid liability by proving that it would have made the same decision without 
the impermissible motive." Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (per curiam). 
192. Id. 
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race-conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief," the Court 
made clear that "where there is no allegation of an ongoing or immi­
nent constitutional violation to support a claim for forward-looking 
relief, the government's conclusive demonstration that it would have 
made the same decision absent the alleged discrimination precludes 
any finding of liability."193 
Taken at face value, Lesage means that a white plaintiff like Tracy, 
for whom a defendant institution can make a same-decision showing, 
has no viable § 1983 claim. The Court regarded a same-decision 
showing as a complete defense to § 1983 liability, not merely as a de­
fense to certain remedies. Tracy's best recourse, Lesage suggests, is to 
challenge the admissions policy through a claim for "forward-looking 
relief," supported by an "allegation of an ongoing or imminent consti­
tutional violation."194 To maintain such a claim, Tracy "need not af­
firmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if 
race were not considered. "195 Lesage thus circumscribes the range of 
substantive claims available to white applicants who seek to challenge 
affirmative action. Even a plaintiff properly positioned to assert an 
equal-footing claim cannot succeed under § 1983 if the defendant uni­
versity is able to expose the causation fallacy with respect to that 
plaintiff. Lesage is not framed as a case about standing, but the rule it 
announces seems functionally equivalent to a holding that a same­
decision showing defeats the standing of a white applicant seeking to 
use § 1983 to challenge affirmative action.196 
Although Lesage and its implications appear straightforward, the 
decision is susceptible to some doubt. The holding appears to be a 
rather awkward solution for the Court's stated goal of preventing a 
§ 1983 plaintiff from achieving an outcome that would not have re-
193. Id. 
194. Id. Although Lesage leaves open this possibility for white applicants in Tracy's po­
sition, Tracy himself is unable to take advantage of it. After he was rejected by the 
University of Georgia, Tracy enrolled at another college. See Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). Two years later, he won admission to 
the University of Georgia as a transfer student and remained a student there during the liti­
gation. Id. Under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983), a plaintiff seeking 
prospective injunctive relief must allege a "real and immediate" threat of future injury aris­
ing from unlawful conduct. The Eleventh Circuit determined that, under Lyons, Tracy lacks 
standing to seek forward-looking relief. Finding "no evidence that he intends to reapply for 
admission to UGA under any version of the freshman admissions policy," the court of ap­
peals concluded that "[t)here is no likelihood . . .  that he will ever again be exposed to 
UGA's allegedly discriminatory freshman admissions process." Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1284-
85. 
195. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1286 (quoting Lesage, 528 U.S. at 21). 
196. The district court in the Georgia litigation read Lesage as "enunciat[ing) a standing 
requirement." Tracy v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. CV 497-45, 2000 WL 
1123268, at *9 (S.D. Ga. June 16, 2001). But the Eleventh Circuit maintained that a same­
decision showing under Lesage goes to the merits of a § 1983 claim, not to standing. See 
Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1280. 
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suited in the absence of the defendant's allegedly unconstitutional 
conduct.197 As some commentators have argued, a same-decision 
showing should be understood as bearing on the issue of remedy, not 
liability.198 After all, the fact that Tracy would have been rejected had 
he competed in a race-neutral process does not mean that he would 
have been rejected had he competed on an equal footing with black 
applicants in the race-conscious process being challenged. Indeed, 
Lesage recognized that the denial of admission is an injury distinct 
from the denial of opportunity to compete on an equal footing.199 A 
same-decision showing negates the first type of injury, but not the sec­
ond. 
It thus seems incorrect to say that a § 1983 plaintiff who asserts a 
valid equal-footing claim has suffered "no cognizable injury warrant­
ing relief" if it is shown that he would not have been admitted absent 
racial preferences.200 Even if Tracy is not entitled to an order of admis­
sion or actual damages resulting from his denial of admission, he is at 
least entitled to nominal damages if he prevails on the merits of his 
equal-footing claim.201 The law should not make a § 1983 plaintiff bet­
ter off than he would have been absent the alleged constitutional vio­
lation, but it also should not make the plaintiff worse off. Yet that is 
what results when a § 1983 plaintiff who establishes that "the govern­
ment has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision 
adverse to [him]"202 is foreclosed from obtaining nominal damages in 
recognition of the violation. 
Such a result is in substantial tension with the Supreme Court's 
holding in Carey v. Piphus that a § 1983 plaintiff who has shown a pro­
cedural due process violation but no consequential harm may recover 
nominal damages to vindicate the constitutional right.203 Lesage, a per 
197. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977) (describing 
the policy objectives underlying the Court's holding). 
198. See, e.g. , Sheldon Nahmod, Mt. Healthy and Causation-in-Fact: The Court Still 
Doesn't Get It!, 51 MERCER L. REV. 603, 610-17 (2000); Christina B. Whitman, An Essay on 
Texas v. Lesage, 51 MERCER L. REV. 621, 632-34 (2000). 
199. See Lesage, 528 U.S. at 21-22. 
200. Id. at 21. 
201. Observing that Lesage was limited to § 1983, the district court held that Tracy had 
succeeded in showing that the university's admissions process violated Title VI and that he 
was entitled to nominal damages under Title VI. See Tracy, 2000 WL 1123268, at *11-*12. 
202. Lesage, 528 U.S. at 20. 
203. See 435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978). The tension between Lesage and Carey has been 
noted elsewhere. See Tracy, 2000 WL 1123268, at *9-*10; Nahmod, supra note 198, at 611-12; 
Whitman, supra note 198, at 632-34. Carey was a procedural due process case involving the 
suspension of two high school students without an adjudicatory hearing. The Court held that 
while substantial damages under § 1983 for a deprivation of procedural due process must be 
proven and may not be presumed, see Carey, 435 U.S. at 262-65, "the denial of procedural 
due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury," id. at 
266 (citations omitted). "Even if respondents' suspensions were justified, and even if they did 
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curiam opinion issued without briefing or oral argument, did not men­
tion Carey, nor did it address the issue of nominal damages.204 It is 
possible that Lesage reflects a silent effort by the Court to cabin Carey 
and thereby reduce incentives for civil rights litigation.205 But given the 
special solicitude that the current Court has shown toward the claims 
of white plaintiffs challenging affirmative action, it would not be sµr­
prising to see Lesage modified or limited in a future case brought by a 
§ 1983 plaintiff who seeks nominal damages on an equal-footing claim. 
Category 3: Allan Bakke? 
Finally, the cases of Davis, Green, and Tracy are as noteworthy for 
the narratives they reveal as for the one they do not. In every process 
of selective admissions that uses racial preferences, there is a small 
group of white applicants who not only would have been admitted had 
they been nonwhite, but also would have been admitted had the proc­
ess been completely race-neutral. These are the applicants who ac­
count for the marginal effect of affirmative action on the odds of ad­
mission facing the pool of white applicants taken as a whole. Such 
applicants, of course, are in the strongest position to challenge af­
firmative action; they are legitimate purveyors of the Bakke narrative. 
With respect to this group, there can be no doubt that racial prefer­
ences present very serious problems of fairness. 
It is important to note, however, that the absence of an example 
from this group in the Davis-Green-Tracy litigation is not an accident. 
In the current round of legal challenges to affirmative action, one 
searches in vain for examples of plaintiffs who convincingly fit the 
Bakke paradigm.206 The reason appears to be two-fold. First, such ap-
not suffer any other actual injury," the Court explained, "the fact remains that they were de­
prived of their right to procedural due process." Id. "By making the deprivation of such rights 
actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the impor­
tance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, it 
remains true to the principle that substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate 
actual injury." Id. 
204. Cf. Lesage, 528 U.S. at 19 ("Lesage filed suit seeking money damages and injunc­
tive relief." (emphasis added)). 
205. Lesage is broadly consistent with other recent decisions reducing incentives for civil 
rights litigation. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Va. Dep't of Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-04 (2001) (limiting "prevailing party" entitled to attorneys' 
fees under various civil rights statutes to a party who has secured a judgment on the merits 
or a court-ordered consent decree); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (stating that 
for a § 1983 plaintiff who wins nominal damages but no compensatory damages, "the only 
reasonable (attorneys'] fee is usually no fee at all"). 
206. We have already seen that Davis, Green, Tracy, and Bakke do not fit the mold. 
Similarly, in Lesage, all evidence indicated that the plaintiff would not have been admitted to 
the University of Texas doctoral program even if the school's admissions process had been 
colorblind. See 528 U.S. at 19-20 (quoting the district court's conclusion that "any considera­
tion of race had no effect on this particular individual's rejection"); see also supra note 180. 
In DeFunis v. Odegaard, the rejected white plaintiff, Marco DeFunis, was among the bottom 
thirty-three applicants on a waiting list consisting of 155 applicants for a first-year law school 
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plicants are statistically quite rare. The number of white applicants 
displaced by minority applicants who may be said to have benefited 
from affirmative action - i.e., who are admitted in the margin be­
tween a hypothetical race-neutral admission rate and the actual mi­
nority admission rate - is extraordinarily small compared to the total 
number of white applicants who fail to gain admission. Using the 
yield-adjusted race-neutral admission rates in Table 2, we can calcu­
late the total number of white applicants in Bowen and Bok's study 
who would have been admitted in the absence of racial preferences.207 
If we were to subtract from that total the number of white applicants 
who actually were admitted in Bowen and Bok's study, we would find 
that the difference represents only 1.5% of the white applicants who 
class with an enrollment limit of 150. See 507 P.2d 1169, 1 176 (Wash. 1973), dismissed as 
moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). Ultimately, the school removed DeFunis from the waiting list and 
rejected him. At that time, "275 students were admitted," and "55 students remained on the 
waiting list." 507 P.2d at 1 176; see id. (twenty-nine applicants with a higher academic ranking 
than DeFunis were denied admission). In Hopwood, through an evidentiary analysis de­
scribed by the Fifth Circuit as "painstakingly thorough" and "eminently correct," Hopwood 
v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 272 (5th Cir. 2000), the district court determined that none of the four 
plaintiffs would have been admitted to the University of Texas Law School had the admis­
sions process been race neutral. See Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 893-901 (W.D. 
Tex. 1998). The available records of the University of Washington and University of 
Michigan lawsuits do not contain any findings on this issue. 
I am aware of only one reported case (other than Bakke) where a federal court has 
found that a white plaintiff would have been admitted in the absence of racial preferences. 
See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1376-77 (S.D. Ga. 
2000), aff d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001) (invalidating the University of Georgia's admis­
sions policy). Yet in that case, the finding is far from convincing. There, after observing that 
under Lesage the university could avoid liability if it could make a same-decision showing, 
the district court determined that the university failed to carry its burden of proving that two 
plaintiffs, Aimee Bogrow and Molly Ann Beckenhauer, would not have been admitted even 
under a race-neutral system. Based on the published opinion, however, it appears that the 
university did not make any attempt to meet its evidentiary burden. The opinion reviews and 
rejects statistical evidence offered by intervenors in the case, but nowhere does it suggest 
that the university offered any evidence of its own. Tellingly, the district court observed: 
The evidentiary showing Mt. Healthy requires, incidentally, is not difficult to understand. 
UGA could have made a same-decision showing by demonstrating, for example, that: (a) 
1000 applicants were denied admission at the TSI stage; and (b) after re-ranking all the TSI­
stage applicants (applying all but the race and gender TSI factors), the plaintiffs ranked 
among the bottom 1,000 applicants. But it has not done this . . . .  
Id. at 1377. Beckenhauer, it should be noted, would have been rejected even if she had re­
ceived the 0.5-point credit given to minority applicants. See id. at 1365-66 (TSI cut-off for 
proceeding to the edge read was 4.66; Beckenhauer's TSI was 4.06). She thus stands in the 
same position as Ashley Davis and Craig Green. Bogrow was a stronger applicant; like Kirby 
Tracy, she would have been admitted had she been a minority applicant. See id. (Bogrow's 
TSI was 4.52; applicants above 4.92 were automatically admitted). But that fact, as Tracy's 
example shows, does not mean Bogrow would have been admitted under a race-neutral pro­
cess. 
207. Yield-adjusted race-neutral admission rates appear in Table 2 as well as line 10 of 
Table B of the Appendix. Line 4 of Table A of the Appendix gives the number of white ap­
plicants within each SAT interval. The number of white applicants who would have been 
admitted under yield-adjusted race-neutral admission rates is (.067)(1062) + (.117)(593) + 
(.155)(939) + (.162)(1507) + (.209)(2075) + (.206)(2816) + (.238)(3384) + (.254)(3878) + 
(.308)(3532) + (.398)(2766) + (.508)(1507) + (.627)(642) = 6,701 . 
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actually were rejected.208 The dearth of bona fide Bakke plaintiffs thus 
directly reflects the dearth of such applicants. Bakke himself, we have 
learned, did not provide a genuine example. 
At any given institution, moreover, a further consideration tends 
to lessen the likelihood that an applicant with a legitimate complaint 
of displacement will go to court. A white applicant who seeks admis­
sion to a particular school, but is displaced by affirmative action, is 
necessarily one who has come very close to being admitted. If an ap­
plicant of that caliber were to apply to several comparable schools, it 
seems improbable that she would be rejected in every instance. An 
applicant who is truly close to the cusp of admission at one institution 
will more than likely fall on the other side of the cusp at one of the 
other institutions to which she applied. Such an applicant makes an 
unlikely plaintiff. If, for example, a white student applies to ten selec­
tive schools and, though rated highly at each school, is rejected by all 
but one or two, the applicant may have legitimate grounds for com­
plaining that she was displaced as a result of affirmative action. But 
because she has gained admission to one or two schools of comparable 
quality, her incentive (and, I suspect, psychological urge) to file a law­
suit is considerably attenuated. In this regard, it is interesting to note 
that in 1973, Allan Bakke failed to gain admission not only to the 
Davis Medical School, but also to ten other medical schools to which 
he applied.209 Bakke, like most white applicants and plaintiffs, was not 
close to the cusp. 
C. Summary 
Not all unsuccessful white applicants are similarly situated with re­
spect to the impact of racial preferences in selective admissions. From 
the Georgia examples, three distinct categories emerge. Category 1 
consists of white applicants who neither would have been admitted 
had there been no racial preferences nor would have been admitted 
had they been nonwhite. This category includes not only applicants 
like Ashley Davis, whose application was denied on the basis of 
wholly race-neutral criteria, but also applicants like Craig Green, 
whose application was exposed to unequal treatment but ultimately 
denied on race-neutral grounds. Category 1 applicants are not rare; in 
Bowen and Bok's study, they account for nearly half of all rejected 
208. We observed previously that 6433 white applicants were actually admitted and that 
18,267 white applicants were actually rejected. See supra note 163. Thus, eliminating racial 
preferences would have increased the number of admitted white applicants by 268 (6701 mi­
nus 6433), which amounts to 1.5% of rejected white applicants. 
209. See Amici National Urban League, supra note 32, at 12 n.6 (observing that Bakke 
was rejected by Bowman-Gray, University of South Dakota, University of Cincinnati, 
Wayne State University, Georgetown University, Mayo, UCLA, San Francisco, Stanford 
and University of Minnesota). 
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white applicants. Category 2 consists of white applicants who would 
not have been admitted had there been no racial preferences but, un­
like Davis and Green, would have been admitted had they been non­
white. Kirby Tracy falls into Category 2, and these applicants also 
compose slightly less than half of the unsuccessful white applicants in 
Bowen and Bok's sample. Finally, Category 3 consists of white appli­
cants who not only would have been admitted had they been nonwhite 
but also, unlike Tracy, would have been admitted had there been no 
racial preferences. The conventional yet erroneous view is that Allan 
Bakke belongs to this group, which accounts for less than 2% of the 
rejected white applicants in Bowen and Bok's study.210 
Notably, this typology is not contingent on the particular charac­
teristics of the Georgia admissions process. If a selective institution at­
tracts far more white applicants than available seats, and if it admits 
far more white applicants than minority applicants, then the white ap­
plicants it rejects may be grouped into the categories described above, 
however the institution chooses to structure its use of race in admis­
sions. Moreover, what is important in this breakdown is not the abso­
lute precision of the percentages; one might expect the numbers to 
vary somewhat from institution to institution. What is important, 
rather, is a feel for relative magnitudes. The story of Allan Bakke, 
however compelling it may be in public discourse on affirmative ac­
tion, captures only the tiniest sliver of the real impact of racial prefer­
ences on white applicants. 
Altogether absent from the Bakke narrative are the Category 1 
stories of Ashley Davis, Craig Green, and the large percentage of re­
jected white applicants whose failure to gain admission cannot be at­
tributed in any way to their race. The size of this group is a powerful 
testament to the sheer statistical realities of selective admissions: So 
steep are the odds that not only do the vast majority of unsuccessful 
white applicants have no plausible claim that they were displaced by 
minority admittees, but a substantial number (close to half) have no 
plausible claim that race had anything to do with their rejection. The 
undue prominence of the Category 3 narrative directly reflects the in­
visibility of Category 1 applicants in the affirmative action debate. 
Category 3's exaggerated significance is also attributable in part to 
the linguistic elision of Category 2 claims with Category 3 claims. Both 
categories of applicants may properly claim they were denied admis­
sion "because of race." Indeed, both have standing to challenge af-
210. Theoretically, there is a fourth category consisting of white applicants who would 
not have been admitted had they been nonwhite but would have been admitted had there 
been no racial preferences. Given the substantial variation in admissions processes, I cannot 
say with total certainty that no white applicants fall into such a category. But because all evi­
dence suggests that it is far more difficult for a rejected white applicant to have gained ad­
mission in the absence of racial preferences than with the benefit of a racial preference, it 
seems safe to assume the fourth category is a null set. 
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firmative action. It is not always true, however, that a white applicant 
who would have been admitted had she been able to benefit from a 
racial preference also would have been admitted had the admissions 
process employed no racial preferences at all. In fact, the vast majority 
of such applicants would have been rejected even under a race-neutral 
process. The conventional narrative, in addition to omitting Category 
1, makes no effort to distinguish between Category 2 and Category 3. 
As a consequence, the narrative captures none of the most typical ef­
fects of affirmative action on white applicants, even as it portrays the 
truly exceptional case as the rule. 
IV. RESHAPING THE DEBATE 
At the outset, I stated that my intention in this Article was not to 
resolve the ultimate fairness or constitutionality of affirmative action. 
The causation fallacy gives rise to a distorted understanding of how 
affirmative action affects white applicants. But exposing its illogic does 
not abolish the standing of every white plaintiff, nor does it refute 
every legal claim a proper plaintiff might assert. If it is true, as I sus­
pect, that white applicants in Category 3 make unlikely plaintiffs, and 
if courts continue to deny standing to Category 1 applicants, then the 
constitutionality of affirmative action will likely be settled in a case 
brought by an applicant in Category 2. Such an applicant will resemble 
Allan Bakke: strong enough to gain admission had he been a minority 
applicant, but not strong enough to gain admission had there been no 
racial preferences. Under current law, as long as the plaintiff seeks 
prospective relief, dispelling the causation fallacy will not settle the 
merits of his case.211 
Nevertheless, recognizing the causation fallacy is important to 
evaluating the constitutional merits of affirmative action to the extent 
that it narrows and focuses the nature of the burden affirmative action 
imposes on white applicants. The application of strict scrutiny, while 
doctrinally elaborate, inevitably tends to reflect some fundamental 
understanding and balancing of the burdens and benefits associated 
with the challenged policy. As Justice Marshall observed three dec­
ades ago, the degree of rigor actually exercised by a court in scruti­
nizing a particular classification typically depends on "the character of 
the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in 
the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they 
do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classi­
fication."212 The second factor, which inquires into the nature and se-
211. See supra notes 194-195 and accompanying text (discussing Texas v. Lesage, 528 
U.S. 18 (1999)). 
212. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 ,  99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dis­
senting) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); 
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verity of the deprivation caused by the classification, finds expression 
in modem narrow tailoring analysis. Although the Supreme Court has 
not defined precisely what narrow tailoring demands in the context of 
race-conscious admissions, the impact of affirmative action on white 
applicants will be a relevant factor.213 A proper characterization of that 
impact is therefore essential to assessing the legal merits of affirmative 
action. 
By clarifying that displacement is not the most widespread harm 
suffered by white applicants, dispelling the causation fallacy has the 
important consequence of forcing a closer examination of exactly how 
affirmative action harms white applicants, especially those in Category 
2, the applicants most likely to become litigants. Category 2 applicants 
are plainly disadvantaged by their ineligibility for a racial preference; 
had they been evaluated on an equal footing with minority applicants, 
they would have been admitted. When Category 2 applicants go to 
court, however, what they seek is not an admissions process that enti­
tles them to a preference on par with the preference given to minority 
applicants. What they seek, rather, is a process that employs no racial 
preferences at all. Yet under such a process, Category 2 applicants 
would meet the same fate as they would under a race-conscious proc­
ess: They would be rejected. Thus, no coherent relation between the 
type of unfairness complained of and the type of fairness sought can 
be forged from a consideration of tangible harm. The desired remedy, 
while greatly reducing the number of minority admittees and replacing 
them with white applicants in Category 3, would not alter any out­
comes for white applicants in Category 2. 
Ultimately, for Category 2 applicants, the complaint of unequal 
treatment must hinge on some form of intangible injury. As I stated 
earlier, the notion that affirmative action expresses racial prejudice 
against white applicants is, in my view, a nonstarter,214 and I know of 
no reported case in which a white plaintiff has relied on such a theory. 
Separate from that notion, however, is the concern that an admissions 
process that uses racial preferences as a means of enhancing educa­
tional diversity runs the risk of stereotyping white applicants. Racial 
see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("There is only one 
Equal Protection Clause . . . . I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the 
two-tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method 
of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that 
actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion."). 
213. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion) (narrow 
tailoring depends in part on "the impact of the [race-conscious action] on the rights of third 
parties"); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281-83 (1986) (plurality opinion) 
(evaluating burden on innocent parties imposed by race-based hiring goals as part of narrow 
tailoring inquiry); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd. 195 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 1999) (con­
sidering "the burden of the Policy on innocent third parties" in evaluating whether a local 
school district's race-conscious admissions policy was narrowly tailored). 
214. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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stereotyping afflicts white applicants when a university's admissions 
process, in pursuing educational diversity, expresses illegitimate as­
sumptions about the viewpoints and experiences of white applicants in 
relation to their minority counterparts. In other words, membership in 
a minority racial group may not be used as the sole or primary means 
for classifying applicants into those who are able and those who are 
unable to contribute to educational diversity. 
The Eleventh Circuit's recent opinion striking down the University 
of Georgia's admissions policy invoked precisely this line of reasoning 
in defining the harm suffered by white applicants.215 An admissions 
policy premised on educational diversity, the Eleventh Circuit said, 
may not take race into account while "permit[ting] no favorable 
treatment of [white] applicants whose personal backgrounds or 
skills . . .  undeniably promot[e] diversity."216 Depending on the institu­
tion and its mission, such applicants may include 
[i]ndividuals who come from economically disadvantaged homes; indi­
viduals who have lived or traveled widely abroad; individuals from re­
mote or rural areas; individuals who speak foreign languages; individuals 
with unique communications skills (such as an ability to read Braille or 
communicate with the deaf); and individuals who have overcome per­
sonal adversity or social hardship.217 
The point is that "when a university, in the name of student body di­
versity, grants preferential treatment to some applicants based on 
race, it must ensure that applicants are fully and fairly examined as in­
dividuals for their potential contributions beyond race to diversity."218 
A university that fails to do so "unfairly burden[s] 'innocent' third par­
ties - specifically, white applicants, or more particularly, white appli­
cants who may have greater potential to enhance student body diver­
sity" than minority applicants.219 
215. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). Con­
spicuously, and to its credit, the Eleventh Circuit nowhere identified displacement as a harm 
to white applicants, even though the district court had ordered the admission of two of the 
three plaintiffs on the ground that the university failed to prove they would not have been 
admitted in the absence of affirmative action. But cf supra note 206 (discussing weakness of 
district court's determination). 
216. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1255. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 1257. 
219. Id. at 1260. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the University of Georgia's ad­
missions policy failed in this regard on two counts. First, the second stage of review (the TSI 
stage), while including race as a diversity factor, did not include a sufficiently broad range of 
nonracial factors to ensure that "an applicant's true potential to contribute to diversity is 
ever fully and fairly assessed." Id. at 1258. "[T)o take only one example, an applicant who 
has spent her summers performing volunteer work in a less developed 'third world' country 
presumably would add far more diversity to the class than many of her peers who worked at 
more ordinary and less challenging summer jobs, yet at the TSI stage the uniqueness of her 
experience is wholly ignored." Id. at 1255. Second, the degree of preference given to non­
white applicants at the TSI stage was "disproportionate to the very few [nonracial) diversity-
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In a diversity-based admissions program, the risk of improper 
stereotyping is no doubt real and raises valid constitutional concerns 
that have been recognized by the Supreme Court.220 Aware of the 
complexity in this area,221 I am not inclined to expand this Article into 
a theory of whether and when stereotyping is constitutionally permis­
sible. That is a topic for another day. Here I am content to offer three 
limited observations. First, the stereotyping argument, as asserted by 
related factors that may permissibly be considered at that stage, and quite plainly [was] con­
siderable relative to the many factors relating as much if not more directly to diversity that 
the TSI formula wholly excludes." Id. at 1257. "[B)y weighing race so heavily, UGA neces­
sarily discounts other non-academic factors in the TSI that may in some instances be far 
more accurate barometers for diversity." Id. at 1258. 
In this regard, the personal stories of well-known white plaintiffs like Jennifer Gratz and 
Cheryl Hopwood have particular salience. Gratz, a good student with many extracurricular 
involvements, came from a working-class home where neither parent had finished college. 
See Cohen, supra note 9. Hopwood, the mother of a severely disabled child, applied to law 
school at age twenty-eight after working all through high school and then putting herself 
through community college and a four-year bachelor's program at a non-selective state 
school. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 946 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Her circumstance would 
bring a different perspective to the law school."); Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 903 
(W.D. Tex. 1998); Richard Bernstein, Racial Discrimination or Righting Past Wrongs?, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 1994, at BS ("Ms. Hopwood's father died when she was a girl and she was 
reared under difficult circumstances by her mother."). Both Gratz and Hopwood had solid 
academic credentials (indeed, many applicants with similar credentials were admitted in the 
years they applied), and both overcame disadvantages. But elite schools traditionally have 
not sought out applicants with the social, educational, or economic profile of Gratz's family 
or Hopwood's. See Pricing the Poor Out of College, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2002, at A22 (criti­
cizing "a national system that is directing more and more its resources at middle- and upper­
income students"). It is worth questioning whether white applicants like Gratz and 
Hopwood, instead of attacking affirmative action, might do better to urge top schools com­
mitted to genuine educational diversity to place a higher premium on first-generation college 
attendance or growing up in a blue-collar home. See id. (finding Mount Holyoke and Smith 
Colleges noteworthy because they "have historically taken it upon themselves to seek out 
first-generation college students as well as women who are returning to school after mother­
hood or careers"); cf Sturm & Guinier, supra note 75, at 992 ("Cheryl Hopwood . . .  do[es] 
not see the class-based connection between [her] own exclusion and that of the beneficiaries 
of affirmative action."). 
220. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) ("[Racial gerrymandering] reinforces 
the perception that members of the same racial group - regardless of their age, education, 
economic status, or the community in which they live - think alike, share the same political 
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions 
elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes."); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 
(1992) ("This Court firmly has rejected the view that assumptions of partiality based on race 
provide a legitimate basis for disqualifying a person as an impartial juror . . . .  We therefore 
reaffirm today that the exercise of a peremptory challenge must not be based on either the 
race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the party."). 
221. For commentary examining racial stereotyping in other legal contexts, including 
law enforcement, broadcast licensing, jury selection, and voting rights, see, for example, 
Leonard M. Baynes, Paradoxes of Racial Stereotypes, Diversity and Past Discrimination in 
Establishing Affirmative Action in FCC Broadcast Licensing, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 979 (2000); 
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jura/ Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community Repre­
sentation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353 (1999); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting 
Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1996); and David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by 
Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 296 (2001). 
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white applicants, is separate and distinct from the concern that af­
firmative action stereotypes minority applicants. Affirmative action, it 
has long been argued, imposes a damaging stigma of inferiority on all 
minority students, whether or not they have actually benefited from 
affirmative action. Moreover, when implemented to promote educa­
tional diversity, racial preferences may generate an expectation that 
minority students will represent a particular "minority perspective" 
both inside and outside the classroom. These concerns are legitimate, 
and in my view the assumption of inferiority fostered by racial prefer­
ences may well be the most powerful objection to affirmative action.222 
My point here, however, is that such stereotyping concerns are not 
ones that white plaintiffs have any standing to raise. Indeed, the per­
son best positioned to raise these issues is a minority student who 
would have been admitted, or was in fact admitted, without any bene­
fit from affirmative action. Yet minority students who have intervened 
in the current wave of lawsuits have not gone to court in order to raise 
stereotyping concerns. Instead, they have sought to preserve affirma­
tive action policies by supplementing diversity rationales with reme­
dial rationales.223 It would thus be ironic - and not a little disingenu­
ous - for a white plaintiff challenging affirmative action to prevail on 
the ground that racial preferences hurt minority students. 
Second, the claim that affirmative action improperly stereotypes 
white applicants is also distinct from the claim that race is altogether 
irrelevant to educational diversity. The latter claim appears most 
starkly in Hopwood, where the Fifth Circuit declared that the consid­
eration of race in choosing students "is no more rational on its own 
terms than would be choices based upon the physical size or blood 
type of applicants. "224 Yet in the context of educational diversity, the 
notion that race is an arbitrary attribute, on par with "physical size or 
blood type," seems difficult to square with reality.225 Children of dif­
ferent races grow up with different social and cultural experiences, and 
"these differences of experience in turn shape attitudes, producing 
characteristically different beliefs and judgments about society as a 
whole, and contrasting impressions of the relation" among various 
races.226 Moreover, racial differences of experience are exacerbated by 
222. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
BABY (1991); SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF 
RACE IN AMERICA (1990). 
223. See, e.g. , Johnson, 263 F.3d 1234, at 1264-65; Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 
(E.D. Mich. 2001). 
224. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir. 1996). 
225. For an impressive compilation of empirical evidence demonstrating the relation 
between racial diversity and educational goals, see Compelling Need, supra note 75 (con­
taining expert reports in the University of Michigan litigation). 
226. Kronman, supra note 14, at 879. See generally IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY 
LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996). 
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continuing and even worsening patterns of residential and educational 
segregation.227 Indeed, there is nothing remarkable in the observation 
that " [b]lacks and Hispanics - and, to varying degrees, other ethnic 
minorities as well - have an experience of life different from that of 
their white counterparts and as a result form different judgments about 
the organization of American society and the integrity and fairness of its 
basic institutions,'' such as the police, courts, schools, banks, and private 
businesses.228 The common-sense truth of this proposition focuses the 
stereotyping argument asserted by white plaintiffs not on the wholesale 
arbitrariness of race in admissions, but on the arbitrariness of taking 
race into account without also taking into account other personal attrib­
utes relevant to educational diversity. The argument is not that race is 
an irrelevant factor, but that race is not the only relevant factor. 
Finally, and most importantly, understanding the harm to white 
applicants from racial preferences in terms of stereotyping as opposed 
to displacement tends to frame the affirmative action debate in less 
polarizing terms. The causation fallacy fundamentally conceives of af­
firmative action as a policy that pits minority applicants against whites. 
That conception invites courts, policymakers, and commentators to be 
either "for" or "against" affirmative action: Either the ends served by 
affirmative action are worthy enough to warrant the admission of mi­
nority applicants at the expense of whites, or they are not. But such a 
conception is accurate only for a category of white applicants who are 
very few in number and not particularly prone to complain in court. 
The risk of racial stereotyping affects a far greater number of white 
applicants. Evaluating affirmative action against this concern has the 
salutary consequence of defusing the simple opposition between mi­
norities and whites, while centering the debate over racial preferences 
on the facts of how a specific policy actually works when applied to 
white and minority applicants. There are many ways a university might 
227. See Gary Orfield & John T. Yun, Resegregation in American Schools, The Civil 
Rights Project, Harvard University, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/publications/ 
resegregation99.html (June 1999); Compelling Need, supra note 75. 
228. Kronman, supra note 14, at 880; see also Richard Morin & Michael H. Cottman, 
Discrimination's Lingering Sting: Minorities Tell of Profiling, Other Bias, WASH. POST, July 
22, 2001, at Al (reporting results of national survey by Harvard University, Kaiser Founda­
tion, and Washington Post comparing the frequency with which blacks, Hispanics, Asians, 
and whites report experiences of discrimination, profiling, and intolerance); Richard Morin, 
Misperceptions Cloud Whites' View of Blacks, WASH. POST, July 11, 2001, at Al (relating 
similar national survey showing that "large numbers of white Americans incorrectly believe 
that blacks are as well off as whites in terms of their jobs, incomes, schooling and health 
care"). Importantly, the claim here is not that race is a proxy for other characteristics that 
genuinely further the university's interest in educational diversity. For a university that seeks 
educational diversity, an applicant's status as a black American is valuable insofar as grow­
ing up black in America gives rise to an overall life experience that is different from growing 
up white, just as growing up on a farm in Idaho produces a life experience different from 
growing up on the streets of Boston. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Blackness, of course, is not a proxy for growing up black; it is 
one and the same. 
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attempt to assess the potential contributions to educational diversity 
of each applicant, and there are many ways a university might fail in 
this regard. The key point is that the grievances of white applicants 
cannot be meaningfully evaluated through a generalized balancing of 
tangible costs and benefits. What is required is a nuanced examination 
of how a particular affirmative action policy operates and how its op­
eration does or does not accord each applicant equal dignity. 
In all likelihood, this type of scrutiny would have the effect of 
forcing universities to assume a greater administrative burden in de­
signing and implementing their admissions processes. Individualized 
review of each applicant's file would become the norm, regardless of 
the volume of applicants. But the imposition of such a burden would 
be well justified. It seems not too much to require a university that de­
fends affirmative action on the basis of educational diversity to show 
that its admissions process is genuinely designed to achieve educa­
tional diversity.229 Affirmative action is not unqualifiedly good, nor is it 
unqualifiedly bad. As the First Circuit observed in a recent case chal­
lenging the Boston Latin School's race-conscious admissions policy, 
an inquiring court cannot content itself with abstractions . . . .  [W]e must 
look beyond the School Committee's recital of the theoretical benefits of 
diversity and inquire whether the concrete workings of the Policy merit 
constitutional sanction. Only by such particularized attention can we as­
certain whether the Policy bears any necessary relation to the noble ends 
it espouses. In short, the devil is in the details.230 
If we can agree that the details are in fact the relevant zone of inquiry 
and scrutiny, then that alone would be an important step forward in 
the affirmative action debate. 
CONCLUSION 
The basic arithmetic of selective admissions is an essential compo­
nent of any conceptual framework for judging the fairness of affirma­
tive action. Although Bakke paints a compelling portrait of unfairness, 
it is but one part of a more complicated picture. As it turns out, it is 
one small part that does not faithfully capture Bakke's own circum-
229. In response to the University of Georgia's contention that its high volume of appli-
cations precludes personalized review of each one, the Eleventh Circuit said: 
The rejoinder to this is obvious: if UGA wants to ensure diversity through its admissions de­
cisions, and wants race to be part of that calculus, then it must be prepared to shoulder the 
burden of fully and fairly analyzing applicants as individuals and not merely as members of 
groups when deciding their likely contribution to student body diversity. 
Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001). 
230. Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 797-98 (1st Cir. 1998). Citing concerns similar to 
those raised by the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson, the First Circuit in Wessman invalidated the 
Boston Latin School's affirmative action policy on the ground that it "focuses exclusively on 
racial and ethnic diversity." Id. at 798. 
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stances or the circumstances of the vast majority of unsuccessful white 
applicants. Stripped of the causation fallacy, the conventional affirma­
tive action narrative unravels into several narratives, each shaped by 
the application of a particular admissions policy to the attributes and 
qualifications of a particular applicant. Without careful attention to 
the mechanics of affirmative action, it is easy to lapse into the polar­
izing terms of common discourse - minorities versus whites, qualified 
versus unqualified - even as those terms exaggerate the degree of ra­
cial conflict in selective admissions and ignore the utter irrelevance of 
race in the evaluation of large numbers of white applicants. 
Justice Powell is no doubt correct that "there are serious problems 
of justice connected with the idea of preference itself."231 Eventually, 
when the Supreme Court revisits Bakke, it may well determine that 
the problems of justice are so serious that racial preferences must end. 
On the other hand, it may endorse Justice Powell's compromise, or it 
may even develop an alternative. Whatever the Court decides, it will 
face the task of characterizing and explaining precisely what the 
problems of justice are. That explanation might begin with an ac­
knowledgment that Bakke, as a story about what happens to white ap­
plicants in race-conscious admissions, is more fiction than fact. For it is 
only by purging the causation fallacy from our legal and moral dis­
course on racial preferences that we may reach a principled conclusion 
about the ultimate fairness of affirmative action. 
APPENDIX 
TABLE A. As discussed in Part II.B,232 one method of estimating 
race-neutral admission rates is to calculate the overall percentage of 
applicants (black or white) who received an offer of admission within 
each SAT interval. In order to perform this calculation, we must know 
the total number of applicants and the total number of admittees 
within each SAT interval. Figure 2.5 of The Shape of the River com­
pares the probabilities of admission by SAT interval for 1989 black 
and white applicants to the five selective institutions for which Bowen 
and Bok had the most detailed admissions data.233 That figure does not 
show the actual numbers of white and black applicants and admittees 
within each SAT interval. In response to a written request,234 however, 
the Mellon Foundation informed me that in 1989 the five institutions 
received a total of 24,700 applications from whites and 2200 applica­
tions from blacks. The foundation also provided me with data showing 
231. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
232. See supra text accompanying notes 122-124. 
233. The graph appears in the text accompanying note 89, supra. 
234. See Personal correspondence with James L. Shulman, Financial and Administrative 
Officer, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (May 23, 2000) (on file with author) . 
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the percentages of white and black applicants falling within each SAT 
interval. Those percentages appear in Table A, lines 1 and 3. Data 
from the foundation also specify the precise values of the black and 
white admission probabilities depicted in figure 2.5. Those probabili­
ties appear in Table A, lines 6 and 8. 
Curiously, the foundation's estimate of 2200 applications from 
blacks is slightly lower than Bowen and Bok's published estimate that 
the five institutions received " [m]ore than 2,300 applications" from 
black applicants.235 I alerted the foundation to this discrepancy and re­
quested the exact totals or, alternatively, the actual values of the nu­
merators and denominators used to calculate the black and white 
probabilities of admission in Figure 2.5, but the foundation denied my 
request for this data.236 Faced with this ambiguity, I have estimated the 
number of applications from blacks at 2400 in order to provide the 
most generous assessment of the displacement effect caused by af­
firmative action. Because the 2400 figure is almost surely too large,237 
my calculations err on the side of overestimating the displacement ef­
fect. 
Using these data, it is possible to calculate the number of black and 
white applicants and admittees within each SAT interval and, in turn, 
the overall race-neutral rate of admission. For example, 11.4% of 
white applicants and 10.2% of black applicants scored within the 1200-
1249 interval (lines 1 and 3) This comes out to 2816 whites (11.4% of 
24,700) and 245 blacks (10.2% of 2400) (lines 2 and 4), for a total of 
3061 applicants in that SAT interval (line 5). Among these applicants, 
19.3% of whites and 60.0% of blacks were admitted (lines 6 and 8). 
This comes out to 543 white admittees (19.3% of 2816) and 147 black 
admittees (60.0% of 245) (lines 7 and 9), for a total of 690 admittees 
(line 10). Thus the overall rate of admission, regardless of race, is 
22.5% (690 divided by 3061) (line 11). This method of calculation pro­
duces the results in Table A. 
235. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 18. 
236. See Personal Correspondence with James L. Shulman, Financial and Administra­
tive Office, Angrew W. Mellon Foundation (July 11, 2000) (on file with author). 
237. If the number had exceeded 2400, then presumably Bowen and Bok would have 
said that the five institutions received "more than 2400 applications" from black applicants. 
APPENDIX-TABLE A � "' .... 
('") 
::r SAT interval N 
0 
0 
1000- 1050- l lOO- 1 1 50- 1200- 1250- 1300- 1 350- 1400- 1450- � 
<1000 1049 1099 1 149 1 199 1249 1299 1 349 1 399 1449 1499 1500-+ 
I .  Percentage of black appli- .276 .096 . 1 12 . I l l  . 1 12 . 1 02 .091 .050 .031 .0 13 .005 .001 
cants in each SAT interval 
2. Number of black applicants 662 230 269 266 269 245 2 18  120 74 31  1 2  2 
(line I x 2400) 
3. Percentage of white appli- .043 .024 .038 .061 .084 . 1 14 . 137 . 157 . 143 . 1 12 .061 .026 � cants in each SAT interval 
('I> 
4. Number of white applicants 1062 593 939 1 507 2075 28 16 3384 3878 3532 2766 1507 642 Q 
;:::: (line 3 x 24, 700) 
"" 
;:::, 
Total number of applicants 1 5 19  644 ::::t. 
5. 1724 823 1208 1773 2344 3061 3602 3998 3606 2797 c (line 2 + line 4) ;::s 
� 6. Percentage of blacks ad- . 1 70 .354 .406 .462 .555 .600 .739 .646 .800 .696 .750 1 .00 -
milted l5'" 
� 7. Number of blacks admitted 1 1 3 81 109 123 149 147 16 1  78 59 22 9 2 
(line 6 x line 2) 
8. Percentage of whites ad- .033 .096 . 124 . 133 . 187 . 1 93 .226 .250 .307 .399 .51 1 .630 
milted 
9. Number of whites admitted 35 57 1 16 200 388 543 765 969 1084 1 104 767 405 
(line 8 x line 4) 
10. Total number ofadmittees 148 138 225 323 537 690 926 1 047 1 143 1 126 776 407 
(line 7 + line 9) 
,..... 1 1 . Percentage of all applicants . 1 82 .229 .225 .257 .262 .3 17  .403 .5 1 1  .632 ,..... .086 . 168 . 186 
0 admitted (line 10 ... line 5) 
Vl 
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TABLE B. Also as discussed in Part Il.B,238 the race-neutral admis­
sion rates calculated in Table A do not account for the increase in 
yield for black applicants likely to result from the elimination of racial 
preferences. Under a race-neutral process in which black and white 
applicants with comparable SAT scores are admitted at the same rate, 
one would expect black admittees to accept offers of admission at the 
same rate as white admittees. Failing to take this factor into account 
produces an overestimate of the race-neutral admission rate. To see 
this clearly, suppose, for example, that 800 white and 200 black appli­
cants (1000 total) with comparable SAT scores have respective admis­
sion rates of 25% and 50%. Suppose further that white admittees ac­
cept offers of admission 50% of the time, whereas black admittees 
accept only 30% of the time. Under this scenario, 200 white applicants 
and 100 black applicants (300 total) are admitted, and 100 white ad­
mittees and 30 black admittees (130 total) accept offers of admission. 
The methodology for Table A would estimate the race-neutral admis­
sion rate to be 30% (300 divided by 1000), with 240 whites and 60 
blacks (300 total) admitted under a race-neutral process. On the rea­
sonable assumption that the black yield would move up toward the 
white yield of 50% in the absence of racial preferences, however, only 
260 applicants would need to be admitted in order to generate 130 ac­
ceptances. Thus the yield-adjusted race-neutral admission rate is 26% 
(260 divided by 1000), with 208 whites and 52 blacks (260 total) gain­
ing admission. 
This method of adjusting for yield produces the race-neutral ad­
mission rates in Table B. The black and white yield values (lines 1 and 
4) are taken from Figure 2.9 of The Shape of the River.239 
238. See supra text accompanying notes 125-136. 
239. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 8, at 34 fig.2.9. 
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;:i 
:r 
SAT interval N 
0 
§ 
1000- 1050- l lOO- l l 50- 1 200- 1250- 1 300- 1350- 1400- 1450-
<1000 1049 1099 1 149 l l99 1249 1 299 1 349 1 399 1449 1499 1 500+ 
I .  Black yield .418 .309 .385 .379 .375 .319 .313  .306 .214 . 1 88 .222 .000 
2. Number of blacks admitted 
l l 3  8 1  109 123 149 147 1 6 1  78 59 22 9 2 (same as Table A, line 7) 
3. Number of blacks matricu-
47 25 42 47 56 47 50 24 1 3  4 2 0 
� lated (line 1 x line 2) 
� 
4. White yield .593 .633 .594 .536 .554 .534 .543 .522 .491 .458 .441 .364 Q 
i::: "' 
5. Number of whites admitted 
388 543 765 969 1084 l l04 767 405 � 35 57 1 16 200 
5· (same as Table A, line 9) 
;:s 
6. Number of whites matricu-
2 1  36 69 107 2 1 5  290 4 1 5  506 532 506 338 147 � lated (line 4 x line 5) 
s= 
7. Total number of matricu-
154 
-
271 337 465 530 545 5 1 0  340 147 � 68 61  l l  l 
!ants (line 3 + line 6) 
8. Yield-adjusted number of 
l l 5 96 187 287 489 631 856 1015 1 1 10 1 1 14 771 404 
admittees (line 7 + line 4) 
9. Total number of applicants 
1724 823 1208 1773 2344 3061 3602 3998 3606 2797 1 5 1 9  644 (same as Table A, line 5) 
10. Yield-adjusted admission 
.067 . l l 7 . 1 55 . 162 .209 .206 .238 .254 .308 .398 .508 .627 
rate (line 8 + line 9) 
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